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Shanxi piaohao (Shanxi Remittance firms) existed from 1820s to 1910s. During that 
time, the business of Shanxi piaohao prospered quickly yet declined in a sudden. The 
previous scholars ascribed piaohao’s sudden decline to their over-reliance on Qing 
government: when Qing collapsed in 1911, piaohao could not survive as well. 
However, this thesis will argue that the decline of piaohao was already latent since 
piaohao began their business in 1820s and the demise of Qing dynasty was in fact a 
catalyst only. 
The most fundamental reasons for piaohao’s decline lie in their innately 
defective business styles. Specifically, piaohao could not accumulate abundant 
floating capitals for remittance businesses due to their family-style capital raising 
mode. Besides, they did not attach great important to the public deposits and the 
effects of such neglect became more fatal after Qing took back piaohao’s rights to 
access to official treasuries and repositories since 1895. Furthermore, piaohao could 
not effectively get the financial supports from their counterparts, for the thirty Shanxi 
piaohao only loosely connected with each other and had never formed coherent 
financial communities either inside their residential counties or in places where they 
set up branches. Lastly, their bookkeeping method and their dependency on outdated 
chaotic bimetallism currency system also hindered their further business survival and 
expansion in a gradually unified and modernized Chinese financial market.  
Moreover, Shanxi piaohao did not gain numerous benefits through conducting 
official remittance for Qing government. They suffered greatly from the latter’s 
frequent financial appeals since 1850s. Piaohao eventually formed a frightened 
 vi
sentiment towards the Qing government. Thus, piaohao refrained from collaborating 
with Qing government when financial transitions began in 1895 and lost the chance to 
catch up with the modernization process of the Qing government in the realm of 
banking and finance, which further accelerated their decline.  
In sum, piaohao did not carve out their business niches in the Chinese remittance 
market since 1820s. They had constantly faced the remittance competitions from their 
counterparts, qianzhuang, modern Chinese and foreign banks. Besides, piaohao did 
not provide basic financial services such as deposit and loan to common people as 
what local qianzhuang would do, and they could neither extend credits to government 
and modern industries as what the modern banks and foreign banks did. Their decline 
was thus predestined at day they were born.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In early 1820s, the first Shanxi piaohao, named Rishengchang (literally, Prosperity 
after sunrise) began its operation in Pingyao County, Shanxi province. The premises 
of Rishengchang piaohao was a dyestuff firm named Xiyucheng with its head office 
in Pingyao County and main distribution center in Beijing. During the 1820s, the Qing 
dynasty was politically unstable and not well policed that faced frequent internal 
rebellions. These rebellions rendered the transferring of silver taels between Beijing 
and Shanxi at stake. Thus, Lei Luetai, the Beijing manager of Xiyucheng dyestuff 
firm, adopted an alternative method to transfer silver. His method was to hold the 
silver in local repositories, and rely on certificates of exchange for long-distance 
communication. For example, if the Beijing distribution center wanted to transfer 100 
silver taels back to Pingyao County, Lei Luetai would first give the actual amount of 
money to a firm located at Beijing, which had an agency in Pingyao County. After that, 
the head office of the dyestuff firm in Pingyao would reclaim the 100 silver taels from 
the local holdings of the Pingyao agency.  
Such method saved both time and cost. Henceforth, numerous firms in Beijing 
frequently requested Lei Luetai to help them to transfer silver taels through such 
mechanism, and were willing to pay commissions for this. Lei Luetai later found that 
dealing with such remittance services was more lucrative than operating the dyestuff 
firm. Hence, he persuaded the investors to focus primarily on the remittance business. 
The Rishengchang piaohao officially began to conduct inter-provincial remittances 
around the 1820s and it soon opened many branches in main cities over China. In 
1851, Rishengchang owned as many as seventeen branches in China.1 
                                                        
1 Huang Jianhui ed., Shanxi piaohao shiliao [Historical Materials on Shanxi Piaohao, hereafter, SPS], revised 
edition (Shanxi: Shanxi jingji chubanshe, 2002), 43. 
Those branches were at: Beijing, Zhangjiakou, Suzhou, Hankou, Guangzhou, Changsha, Changde, Bianliang, 
Jinan, Xi’an, Chengdu, Chongqing, Yangzhou, Qingjiangpu, Hekou (Jiangxi province), Sanyuan and Tianjin.  
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After the first Shanxi piaohao started its operations, other Shanxi firms were 
impressed by the profits gained through the remittance business, and they 
subsequently opened other piaohao in the region. In 1851, ten piaohao were already 
in operation.2 All of the head offices of the newly-established piaohao were located 
at Pingyao, Qi or Taigu counties in the Shanxi province. 
Piaohao’s role in the Chinese financial market was greatly reinforced during and 
after the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864). They were needed to provide remittance 
services for Qing provincial bureaucracies. Before the rebellion, the provincial 
financial quotas were submitted to the central government in Beijing by transferring 
silver taels escorted by provincial troops. However, during the Rebellion, the previous 
transfer routes were blocked by the rebels, and silver taels were also frequently 
plundered along the way. Thus, in order to submit the financial quotas to Beijing on 
time, the provincial officials resorted to the remittance services provided by Shanxi 
piaohao. They continued to do so even after the end of the Taiping Rebellion in the 
1860s, because submitting provincial quotas via remittance saved much time and 
money. Consequently, piaohao achieved great development during the 1860s period 
under the supports of the various provincial bureaucracies. In 1895, twenty-three 
Shanxi piaohao were in operation.3 However, this success was short-lived. After the 
Qing dynasty fell in 1911, the influence of piaohao on the Chinese financial market 
gradually diminished and most of them were closed down. By 1921, only four Shanxi 
piaohao were still in operation.4 
                                                        
2 SPS, 21. The ten piaohao were Rishengchang, Weitaihou, Weifenghou, Tianchengheng, Weishengchang, 
Xintaihou, Zhichengxin, Rixinzhong, Heshengyuan and Xiehexin. 
3 SPS, 466. 
They are: Rishengchang, Weitaihou, Weifenghou, Weishengchang, Xintaihou, Tianchengheng, Xiehexin, 
Xietongqing, Baichuantong, Weichanghou, Qianshengheng, Yongtaiqing, Qichangde, with head office located in 
Pingyao. Heshengyuan, Dadetong, Daheheng, Sanjinyuan, Cunyigong, Changshengchuan, Dashengchuan, with 
head office located in Qi xian. Zhichengxin, Xiechengqian, Dadeyu, Shiyixin, with head office located in Taigu; 
also refer to Table 1.  
4 The four piaohao were: Dadetong, Dadeheng, Dashengchuan and Sanjinyuan. SPS, 1280.  
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This thesis recounts the history of China’s native remittance firms—the Shanxi 
piaohao—from the 1820s to 1911, and attempts to analyze the reasons for their 
decline. It will demonstrate that the decline of Shanxi piaohao is a long-term process 
and has already latent long before the demise of Qing dynasty. Specifically, it suggests 
that since the first day when Shanxi piaohao began to provide remittance services to 
various provincial bureaucracies of the Qing government, it had never carved out their 
unique niches in the Chinese financial market. On the one hand, they had to compete 
with various counterparts in official remittances. On the other hand, they could neither 
provide basic financial services as qianzhuang could do nor offer financial supports to 
modern industries; extend credits to the governments and coordinate the whole 
financial market as foreign banks and modern Chinese banks could do. Therefore, the 
fundamental reason for piaohao’s decline was determined by their innately defective 
business styles. 
 
1. The significance of studying piaohao 
It is important to note the difference between piaohao and banks. English-language 
literature often refers to piaohao as “Shanxi banks” or “Shanxi remittance banks”.5 
However, although Shanxi piaohao handled money and deposits, piaohao were not 
the modern banks as we know them today. Hence, this thesis will retain the term 
“piaohao” referring exclusively to the remittance firms which originated from Shanxi 
province, instead of using the term “Shanxi banks”. Consequently, the people who 
invested and managed the piaohao would be rendered as “Shanxi piaohao merchants” 
rather than “Shanxi bankers”. The term “bank” in this thesis will only refer to modern 
                                                        
5 See Yang Lien-Sheng, Money and credit in China: a short history (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1952), 
81-84; Frank H. H. King, Money and monetary policy in China, 1845-1895 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1965), 91-94; Frank M. Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China (New York, Institute of pacific relations, 1942), 
19; Andrea Lee McElderry, Shanghai old-style banks (chien-chuang) 1800-1935: a traditional institution in a 
changing society (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International, 1975), 18-20. 
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financial institutions like the foreign banks and modern Chinese banks such as the 
Imperial Bank of China, Bank of the Board of Revenue and later the Great Qing Bank 
which were organized and operated following the principles and patterns of the banks 
in the western world.6 
While previous scholars have dealt with subjects on other Chinese financial 
institutions such as the qianzhuang, modern Chinese banks and foreign banks in 
China, no single book written in English provides a comprehensive research on the 
rise and decline of piaohao. Specifically, Andrea McElderry studied on how Shanghai 
qianzhuang adapted to the rising prominence of foreign trade after 1840 and its role as 
intermediaries between foreign banks and Chinese traders and markets.7 Cheng 
Linsun illustrates the evolution of modern Chinese banking from their birth in the late 
Qing dynasty until 1937, and examines their business practices and their adaptability 
to China’s changing circumstances during that period.8 Brett Sheehan works on how 
modern Chinese banks in Tianjin tried to develop impersonal trusts on banknotes by 
ordinary people during 1916-1937.9 Ji Zhaojin deals with the rise and fall of native 
banks, foreign banks, and modern style Chinese banks in Shanghai in a linear 
framework from 1840 to 1952.10 In contrast, using the latest historical materials on 
piaohao such as the Qing official documents and business correspondences, this thesis 
is the first English-language study on the rise and decline of piaohao.  
The importance of studying piaohao in the context of Chinese banking history 
lays in its unique development trajectory, which is different from that of qianzhuang 
                                                        
6 Cheng Linsun, Banking in modern China: entrepreneurs, professional managers and the development of Chinese 
banks, 1897-1937 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17; Yang, Money and Credit in China, 115. 
7 Andrea McElderry, Shanghai old-style banks (chien-chuang) 1800-1935: a traditional institution in a changing 
society (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International, 1975). 
8 Cheng Linsun, Banking in modern China: entrepreneurs, professional managers and the development of Chinese 
banks, 1897-1937 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003).  
9  Brett Sheehan, Trust in troubled times: money, banks, and state-society relations in Republican Tianjin 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 2003). 
10 Ji Zhaojin, A history of modern Shanghai banking: the rise and decline of China's finance capitalism (New York, 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003). 
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and modern banks. Qianzhuang did not have much contact with the Qing government; 
they either mainly served the local financial markets such as absorbing deposits and 
extending credits to ordinary people and petty merchants, or had frequent contact with 
foreign banks and foreign trade firms such as those large qianzhuang in Shanghai. 
Modern Chinese banks had strong connections with the Chinese central government 
from the very beginning; some gained exclusive privileges and some suffered as a 
result of extraction from the government. Unlike them, piaohao’s development is 
more eclectic, for it was neither independent from the Qing government like 
qianzhuang nor was it closely connected with the Qing government like modern 
Chinese banks.  
Since piaohao’s development did not occur in a political vacuum, the study of 
piaohao would also shed some light on the transition of Qing’s financial policy during 
its last half century from 1860s to 1911. Before the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), the 
Qing government was less interested in extracting revenues from the various 
provinces. Thus, there was an absence of state involvement in setting the rules for 
financial organizations such as piaohao. During and after the Taiping Rebellion, 
piaohao’s remittance business greatly expanded due to the increasing revenue 
demands from the central government to meet the needs of pacifying internal 
rebellions and promoting its self-strengthening movements. At this time, the Qing 
government utilized the services provided by piaohao and frequently extracted extra 
money from them, without providing them with protections. After 1895, the Qing 
government launched a series of campaigns in the realms of finance and banking. It 
set up its own national banks to handle provincial remittances and manage treasuries 
and silver repositories, which seized the business niches of piaohao. It even 
promulgated unprecedented rules to regulate the business and operation of piaohao. 
 6
Thus, the evolution of piaohao is also a good reflection of the financial policy and 
transitions of the Qing government.  
Piaohao are also important to our understanding of Chinese business history. 
Unlike modern Chinese banks that were set up under the influence of western banking 
mechanisms and principles, piaohao’s business organizations and operations were 
more similar to that of indigenous Chinese family firms in the late imperial period. 
Through analyzing piaohao’s capital raising modes, its internal relationships among 
their counterparts, its book keeping methods and so on, this thesis offers another 
insight on Chinese business history in the late Qing period.  
 
2. Chinese scholarship on piaohao 
Since the early Republican period, Chinese scholars began to collect information and 
wrote books and articles on Shanxi piaohao soon after its decline in the 1910s. There 
are two very representative books. One is Shanxi Piaozhuang Kaolue (A Study of 
Shanxi Piaohao) written by Chen Qitian in 1936, who was then a professor in the 
Department of Economics at Yanjing University. The other is an edited volume 
entitled Shanxi Piaohao Shi (A History of Shanxi Piaohao). It was edited in 1944 by 
Wei Juxian, a famous historian, under the authorization of H. H. Kung (Kong 
Xiangxi). These two books offer a general and narrative history of the piaohao. They 
were methodologically based on the fieldworks conducted in the Shanxi province and 
interviews of the former staffs of the piaohao. Wei’s book also includes 
correspondences and ledgers left by some of the piaohao.11 Since the primary 
purpose of their research was to reconstruct the development of piaohao, both of them 
only spent about five pages to analyze why piaohao declined after the collapse of the 
                                                        
11 The correspondences belong to Weitaihou, Rishengchang, Yuanfengjiu, Xietongqing and Dadetong. The ledgers 
belong to Rishengchang and Weitaihou. See Wei Juxian, Shanxi piaohao shi, 173-306. 
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Qing dynasty.12 Their main arguments on the decline of piaohao will be mentioned in 
the literature review part. 
Li Hongling (1847-1918), who was the manager of Weifenghou piaohao’s 
Beijing, Shanghai and Wuhan branch respectively since 1862, compiled and published 
two booklets at his own expense in 1917 in Taiyuan. The two booklets were Tongzhou 
Zhonggao (Admonitions to Fellowmen) and Shanxi Piaoshang Chengbaiji (The 
Success and Failure of Shanxi Piaohao Merchants).13 Tongzhou Zhonggao was a 
compilation of part of Li’s letters to the piaohao proprietors from 1890 to 1912. The 
main contents were Li’s concerns with the possible internal piaohao reforms, such as 
reducing the tenure of the piaohao staffs who worked outside Shanxi province from 
three to two years.14 Shanxi piaoshang chengbaiji collected the correspondences 
written by the various piaohao branches to persuade the proprietors in the head office 
in Pingyao County to endorse the formation of a united Shanxi Remittance Bank 
(jinsheng huiye yinhang) in 1908. However, such innovative proposal was eventually 
turned down by the piaohao proprietors from the head office. Li also wrote a prologue 
introducing the background and the outcome of the 1908 reform; his careful 
observations and comments in the prologue also disclosed the institutional 
transformations of the Qing Dynasty during the last half nineteenth-century. These 
two books are now important primary sources in studying the decline of Shanxi 
piaohao.  
After the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, scholars from 
mainland China began to compile first-hand documents on piaohao since the 1960s. 
Although their studies on piaohao were briefly interrupted during the Cultural 
                                                        
12 Wei Juxian, Shanxi piaohao shi, 18-22; Chen Qitian, Shanxi piaozhuang kaolue, 39-44. 
13 See reprinted edition, Li Hongling, Tongzhou zhonggao[Admonitions to fellowmen] and Shanxi piaoshang 
chengbaiji [The success and failure of Shanxi piaohao merchants] (Taiyuan, Shanxi Jingji Chubanshe, 2003).  
14 Li, Tongzhou zhonggao & Shanxi piaoshang chengbaiji, 137. 
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Revolution (1966-1976), numerous works on piaohao were published in the 1980s. In 
1982, a symposium on Shanxi piaohao was held in Taiyuan, Shanxi province. 
Subsequently, two symposium proceedings were published.15 However, most of the 
articles were now outdated. These papers mainly focused on the issue whether the 
business of piaohao was feudal or capitalist.16 Published soon after the Cultural 
Revolution, the authors’ academic perspectives in the proceedings appeared to be very 
much influenced by the Marxist–Leninist–Maoist paradigm. 
The most prominent monograph by mainland Chinese scholars is Shanxi 
Piaohao Shi [The History of Shanxi Piaohao] by Huang Jianhui published in 1992. It 
provides the most comprehensive narrative history based on voluminous official Qing 
documents, correspondences and ledgers of various piaohao.17 Other works include 
Wanqing Qianzhuang he Piaohao Yanjiu [Studies on Qianzhuang and Piaohao in Late 
Qing Period] by Zhang Guohui, Jinrong Piaohao Shilun [Historical Reviews on 
Piaohao] by Kong Xiangyi, and Piaoshang Xingshuai Shi [The Rise and Decline of 
Piaohao Merchants] by Shi Ruomin.18 All of them shed some light on the decline of 
Shanxi piaohao; their main ideas will also be further developed in this thesis. 
The recent studies on piaohao by mainland Chinese scholars do not rely on new 
primary sources. Instead, most of them rely too heavily on the western economic 
theories such as the institutional change, and models such as demand and supply, to 
                                                        
15 Shanxi piaohao yanjiu zu [Team of Shanxi piaohao studies] ed., Shanxi piaohao yanjiu ji [Symposia on Shanxi 
piaohao], vol. 1, (Taiyuan, Shanxi caijing xueyuan keyanchu, 1982); Shanxi piaohao yanjiu zu [Team of Shanxi 
piaohao studies] ed., Shanxi piaohao yanjiu ji [Symposia on Shanxi piaohao], vol. 2, (Taiyuan, Shanxi caijing 
xueyuan keyanchu, 1984) 
16 From 1949 to 1976, PRC scholars were keen on analyzing the character of a certain historical subject as 
whether it was capitalist or feudalist. This was mainly due to the discussion of whether China had the sprout of 
capitalism itself without the western influence since the late imperial time. As a native financial institution which 
dealt with remittance, the financial nature of piaohao was definitely of high importance. If it was capitalist, it 
would be a good proof for Chinese historians that China had the capitalist sprout in the respect of finance during 
the nineteenth century. 
17 Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi [The history of Shanxi piaohao] (Taiyuan, Shanxi jingji chubanshe,1992). A 
revised edition is published by the same publisher in 2002. 
18 Zhang Guohui, Wanqing qianzhuang he piaohao yanjiu [Studies on qianzhuang and piaohao in late Qing period] 
(Beijing, Zhonghua Shuju, 1989); Kong Xiangyi ed., Jinrong piaohao shilun [Historical reviews of piaohao] 
(Beijing, Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe,2003); Shi Ruomin, Piaoshang xingshuai shi [The rise and decline of 
Piaohao merchants] (Beijing, Zhongguo Jingji chubanshe, 1992). 
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explain the decline of piaohao without referring to abundant primary sources.19 In 
fact, those works using western economic models are not any more useful than the 
earlier Marxist works in explaining the decline of piaohao. Without referring to the 
numerous available primary sources on piaohao, their understandings and analyses 
will never be convincing. Thus, their research made little contributions to explain and 
analyze the decline of piaohao 
 
3. English scholarship 
Compared with the relatively comprehensive Chinese language studies on piaohao, 
the English scholarship on piaohao is rather scarce. No single book deals specifically 
on the topic on Shanxi piaohao. Scholars only made very brief studies on the Shanxi 
piaohao with no more than a chapter. Often, piaohao was brought out to provide a 
general background when the scholars attempt to study financial figures and economic 
phenomena in the late Qing period. The limitations of the western scholarship on 
piaohao might be due to the limited availability of primary sources. In fact, 
comprehensive primary sources on Shanxi piaohao were not published until 1990, 
and the most recent edition with the newly compiled piaohao’s business 
correspondence only appeared in 2002.20 
The earliest English language study on piaohao was done by Joseph Edkins, a 
missionary in Shanghai. In his book Chinese Currency and Prices in China which was 
published posthumously in 1905, Edkins only spent one page on Shanxi piaohao. He 
briefly mentioned that the function of piaohao was to remit silver from one province 
to another with a very low commission. He also suggested that the origin of Shanxi 
                                                        
19 Liu Jiansheng, Ming Qing jinshang zhidu bianqian yanjiu [A study on institutional change of Shanxi merchants 
during Ming-Qing period] (Shanxi, Renmin chuban she, 2005). 
20 See Shanxi piaohao shiliao bianxiedu [Team of the compilation of primary sources on Shanxi piaohao], Shanxi 
piaohao shiliao [The historical materials on Shanxi piaohao] (Taiyuan, Shanxi jingji chubanshe, 1990); Huang 
Jianhui ed., Shanxi piaohao shiliao [Historical Materials on Shanxi Piaohao], revised edition (Shanxi, Shanxi 
jingji chubanshe, 2002). 
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piaohao was between seventh to tenth centuries. However, this was presumably a 
misunderstanding with the fiat money, also known as the flying money (feiqian), 
circulated during that time.21 
Srinivas R. Wagel published Chinese Currency and Banking in 1915. He praised 
the Shanxi piaohao for being the first financial institution in China to transfer money 
using financial instruments instead of silver. With regards to the origins of piaohao, 
Wagel held the same opinion with Edkins.22 Both Edkins and Wagel’s studies on 
piaohao were pretty much similar to Marco Polo’s Travel and contributed very little to 
the academic understanding of the subject. In fact, their accounts were probably based 
only on their cursory observations and even on hearsay. 
Frank Tamagna published his book Banking and Finance in China in 1942. The 
purpose of the book was to study the banking and money market from 1927 to 1940 
and to propagate the financial development in China during that time. This was 
clearly revealed from the preface written by T. V. Soong (Song Ziwen), the then 
Minister of Finance.23 As a result, the narratives of Shanxi piaohao only took up one 
page as part of the background of Chinese banking before 1927. It only noted that the 
founder of Shanxi piaohao was Lei Luetai around the turn of the nineteenth century, 
and mentioned that the collapse of Shanxi piaohao came with the fall of Qing dynasty 
in 1911.24 
Yang Lien-sheng’s book Money and Credit in China published in 1952 provided 
a general history of Shanxi piaohao as one of the old-style banks in China. His 
four-page discussion of the piaohao was mainly based on the Chinese works done by 
earlier scholars such as Chen Qitian and Wei Juxian. However, he also utilized the 
                                                        
21 Joseph Edkins, Chinese currency and prices in China (Shanghai, Presbyterian mission press, 1905), 24. 
22 Srinivas R. Wagel, Chinese currency and banking (Shanghai, North China Daily news and herald, 1915), 
153-57. 
23 Frank M. Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China (New York, Institute of pacific relations, 1942), xiii-xiv. 
24 Tamagna, Banking and Finance in China, 19-20. 
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Decennial Reports, 1882-91 by Imperial Maritime Customs in his study. While his 
work offered a brief description on the origins and general business functions of 
piaohao, it lacked profound analysis on the reasons behind the decline of piaohao.25 
Frank King’s book Money and Monetary policy in China, published in 1965, 
dealt mainly with the various monetary systems in the period from 1845 to 1895. He 
referred briefly to Shanxi piaohao only in the section on the general background of 
Chinese banking system. King argued that “Shanxi banks made little direct 
contribution to the money supply” and thus they were out of the scope of his book.26 
In fact, his recounts on Shanxi piaohao were almost entirely based on Yang 
Lien-Sheng’s earlier book without any new discoveries.27 
Andrea Lee McElderry’s path-breaking study on Shanghai qianzhuang in 1975 
also referred to some basic facts on the piaohao.28 Besides, she asserted that “Shanxi 
banks retained close connections with the central government, and in 1911, when the 
dynasty fell, Shanxi banks all but disappeared.”29 Moreover, she suggested that 
Shanxi piaohao transferred funds over long distances, while qianzhuang moved funds 
over shorter distances.30 McElderry made the above arguments based on Chen 
Qitian’s book and some other secondary works by Chinese scholars such as Yang 
Duanliu.31 
In the book Banking in Modern China: Entrepreneurs, Professional Managers, 
and the Development of Chinese Banks, 1897-1937 by Cheng Linsun in 2003, 
piaohao was again introduced in the background section as one of the institutions of 
                                                        
25 Yang, Money and credit in China: a short history, 81-84. 
26 Frank H. H. King, Money and monetary policy in China, 1845-1895 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 
1965), 94. 
27 King, Money and monetary policy in China,91-94. 
28 Andrea Lee McElderry, Shanghai old-style banks (chien-chuang) 1800-1935: a traditional institution in a 
changing society (Ann Arbor, University Microfilms International, 1975), 17-20. 
29 McElderry, Shanghai old-style banks, 19.  
30 McElderry, Shanghai old-style banks, 19.  
31 Yang Duanliu, Qingdai huobi jinrong shi [A history of money and finance in the Qing dynasty] (Beijing, 
Sanlian shudian, 1962), 130, 136.  
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the Chinese financial market before the emergence of modern Chinese banks. Cheng 
only spent four pages to briefly narrate the general profile of piaohao based on Shanxi 
Piaohao Shi by Huang Jianhui published in 1992, since the main contents of his book 
were on modern Chinese banks. 32 
 
4. Issues remain unsolved by the past scholarship concerning the decline of 
piaohao 
The previous scholarship on piaohao introduced the development and operations of 
piaohao, but did not address the question of why they declined. In order to analyze the 
underlying reasons why piaohao declined after 1911, this thesis attempts to explore 
three important issues.  
Piaohao’s relationship with the Qing government  
The first important question that remains unanswered is the relationship between 
piaohao and the financial needs of the Qing government, and the impact of the Qing 
collapse on the piaohao’s viability. Scholars were inclined to blame piaohao’s over 
reliance on the remittance opportunities provided by the Qing government since 1860s. 
Thus, when the Qing collapsed in 1911, and the Republican government no longer 
employed piaohao to transfer their funds, piaohao were inevitably declined with the 
last dynasty of China. Specifically, the Republican scholar Chen Qitian had contended 
that since piaohao mainly served the Qing court and its officials, therefore, after Qing 
dynasty collapsed in 1911, piaohao followed immediately.33 The mainland Chinese 
scholars such as Kong Xiangyi, Sheng Mujie and Song Huizhong also accepted such 
opinion on the final decline of piaohao. They contended that piaohao were the 
financial agents and props of the Qing dynasty, and they had gained great benefits 
                                                        
32 Cheng Linsun, Banking in modern China: entrepreneurs, professional managers and the development of 
Chinese banks, 1897-1937 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003), 11-14. 
33 Chen Qitian, Shanxi piaozhuang kaolue, 162. 
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through serving the dynasty.34 Kong Xiangyi even concluded that Shanxi piaohao 
merchants had established a notoriously intimate relationship with the Qing 
government and its officials.35 The western scholars such as Yang Lien-Sheng, Frank 
King, McElderry and Cheng Linsun also held the same idea that piaohao fell with the 
Qing dynasty that they served.36 However, they all failed to consider that if piaohao 
had relied heavily on the Qing government, and gained great benefits through serving 
them, why they declined their offers to take part in the establishments of modern 
Chinese banks in 1896 and 1904. 
Conversely, some other scholars denied that piaohao depended heavily on the 
remittance services by the government. Huang Jianhui, Zhang Guohui and Shi 
Ruomin argued that although the piaohao did serve the Qing government, they were 
never the financial institutions. Instead, piaohao’s main business concern was to serve 
the needs of commercial trades during the late imperial times.37 
 In analyzing the relationships between piaohao and the Qing government, this 
thesis contends that both differing perspectives held by the previous scholars have 
some truth in them. On the one hand, there is no doubt that the rise of Shanxi piaohao 
after the 1860s was greatly indebted to the remitting services endorsed by the Qing 
government. On the other hand, the relationship between the piaohao and the 
government was not as pleasant and intimate as the previous scholars had assumed. 
On the contrary, piaohao suffered greatly from the interactions with government after 
                                                        
34 See Kong Xiangyi, “Shanxi piaohao chansheng de beijing he gaolidai xingzhi [The background of the origins 
of Shanxi piaohao and its usurious character]”, in Shanxi piaohao yanjiu ji, vol. 1, 13; Sheng Mujie, “Wo dui 
piaohao qiyuan he xingzhi de kanfa [My opinions concerning the origins of piaohao and its business characters]”, 
in Shanxi piaohao yanjiuji, vol. 1, 4-9; Song Huizhong, “Shanxi piaoshang he guanliao de fei zhengshi guanxi 
[The informal relationship between the Shanxi piaohao merchants and Qing officials]”, in Zhang Zheming et al ed., 
Zhongguo Jinshang yanjiu [Studies on Shanxi merchants, China], 88-126, (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2006). 
35 Kong Xiangyi, “Shanxi piaohao yu qing zhengfu de goujie [The notorious collaborations between Shanxi 
piaohao and Qing government]”, first published in 1994 and reprinted in Kong Xiangyi ed., Jinrong piaohao 
shilun [Historical reviews on piaohao] (Beijing: Zhongguo jinrong chubanshe, 2003), 288-303.  
36 Yang, Money and credit in China, 84; King, Money and monetary policy in China, 94; McElderry, Shanghai 
old-style banks, 19; Cheng, Banking in modern China, 37. 
37 Zhang Guohui, Wanqing qianzhuang he piaohao yanjiu, 101-2, 113; Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi, 530; 
Shi Ruomin, piaoshang xingshuai shi, 371-2. 
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the 1850s and formed a frightened sentiment which prevented them from further 
collaborating with Qing after its financial transitions took place.  
Piaohao and their contemporary financial institutions  
The second issue on analyzing the decline of piaohao is related to the service niche 
occupied by piaohao, and how their business differed from their contemporary 
financial institutions—qianzhuang, foreign banks and modern Chinese banks. 
Previous scholars had assumed that the roles of piaohao in the Chinese financial 
market were indispensable in terms of conducting official remittances after the 1860s. 
Specifically, Huang Jianhui argued that after the 1860s, there were three dominant 
figures with their distinct niches in the Chinese financial market: qianzhuang served 
local businesses; foreign banks supported the foreign trades in China and handled war 
indemnities from the Qing government; and Shanxi piaohao dealt with 
inter-provincial remittances for both the Qing government and merchants.38 Scholars 
such as Chen Qitian, Huang Jianhui, Zhang Guohui and Kong Xiangyi also asserted 
that piaohao provided financial supports to local qianzhuang wherever they set up 
branches with their floating funds. The relations between qianzhuang and piaohao 
were thus harmonious and they never competed with each other.39 
In fact, what the past scholars had all ignored is that piaohao’s decline in the 
1910s was predestined as soon as their roles in the Chinese remittance market were 
reinforced gradually after the 1850s, when they began to conduct a considerable 
portion of official remittances. The truth is that piaohao never carved out their unique 
business niches in the Chinese financial market from the very beginning. Since 
piaohao did not have the ability to monopolize the government’s remittance business, 
                                                        
38 Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi, 216. 
39 See Chen Qitian, Shanxi piaozhuang Kaolue, 156-7; Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi, 216-221; Zhang 
Guohui, Wanqing qianzhuang yu piaohao, 111; Kong Xiangyi, “Qianzhuang yu waishang yinhang he piaohao de 
guanxi [Paohao’s relationships with qianzhuang and foreign banks]”, in Kong Xiangyi ed., Jinrong piaohao shilun 
97-101. 
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they not only have to compete with one and other for business, but also need to 
compete with other remittance firms and qianzhuang, which were also conducting 
official remittance business. This greatly intensified the competition.  
Moreover, with regards to the relations between qianzhuang and piaohao, 
piaohao were not always the patrons for qianzhuang. Generally speaking, piaohao 
were the local patrons of qianzhuang in Northern China, such as in Beijing and 
Tianjin. However, in the South, especially in provinces such as Hunan, Guangdong 
and Fujian, qianzhuang usually provided the necessary floating funds for piaohao 
branches since they could not penetrate into the local financial markets. Thus, in 
southern China, qianzhuang supported the daily operations of piaohao.  
The previous scholars often attributed the decline of piaohao to the stiff 
competitions from the modern Chinese banks established after 1897, which were 
granted monopoly rights and privileges by the Qing government. For example, Huang 
argued that after the Imperial Bank of China was established in 1897, it memorialized 
the Qing government. This gave them first priority to remit inter-provincial remittance, 
which seized a considerable part of piaohao’s remittance business. After the Bank of 
the Board of Revenue was set up in 1905, it was given more privileges to handle 
provincial remittance, silver repositories and so on, which was a further blow to the 
survival of piaohao as well.40 Other scholars such as Chen Qitian, Shi Ruomin also 
held the same idea as Huang.41  
There are two problems to this assertion. First, piaohao could continue to enjoy 
governmental privileges even after 1897 if they agreed to collaborate with those 
modern banks in which they were invited to do so. However, they turned down such 
offers. It was piaohao’s determination not to collaborate with those modern banks. 
                                                        
40 Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi, 418-443, 524-5. 
41 Chen Qitian, Shanxi piaozhuang kaolue, 39-40; Shi Ruomin, Piaoshang xingshuai shi, 311-2. 
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Second, modern Chinese banks were not set up until 1897. Until then, piaohao had 
already operated in China over 70 years. If piaohao’s role in the Chinese financial 
market became indispensable after 1850s as those scholars once assumed, how can it 
be possible that they easily lose to modern Chinese banks soon after their 
establishments?  
In fact, the establishment of modern Chinese banks is not the major factor in the 
decline of Shanxi piaohao. As mentioned earlier, piaohao never carved out their 
business niche in the Chinese remittance and financial market before the generation of 
modern Chinese banks in 1897. In addition, as Cheng Linsun and David Faure have 
argued, the birth of modern Chinese banks is the response to China’s new financial 
demands from modern industries, infrastructures and other modernization programs 
which both qianzhuang and piaohao could not meet.42 
Some scholars such as Shi Ruomin suggested that the decline of piaohao was 
due to the competitions from foreign banks in terms of remittance business.43 His 
assertion is also problematic. Foreign banks began to operate in China since the 1840s, 
while piaohao gained remarkable development in the 1860s. If foreign banks were 
piaohao’s rivals in remittance businesses, why piaohao were able to develop in 
parallel to the foreign banks? As a result, the existence of foreign banks was not the 
fundamental reason for the decline of piaohao. As will be analyzed in Chapter Three, 
while the financial niche of foreign banks was unique, piaohao did not have a distinct 
financial function.  
Piaohao’s defective business styles 
The third issue concerning the decline of piaohao is related to their business styles 
and characteristics, such as their capital raising methods, the sources of their working 
                                                        
42 Cheng Linsun, Banking in modern China, 22. David Faure, China and Capitalism: a history of business 
enterprise in modern China (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), 25. 
43 Shi Ruomin, Piaoshang xingshuai shi, 291-3. 
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funds for remittance business, their internal relationships with each other, 
bookkeeping methods, and manipulations on the different kinds of silver taels. 
However, previous Chinese scholars, such as Huang Jianhui, did not pay enough 
attention to such issues. They only introduced some basic facts on the organizations 
and managements of piaohao.44  
As for the capital raising methods of piaohao, none of the previous works written 
in Chinese had noted the limitations on the capital raising methods of piaohao. David 
Faure is the first scholar who has ever raised such issue. He argues that the reason that 
piaohao lost to modern banks did not lie in the difference in their managerial methods. 
Rather, it could be attributed to their different ways of absorbing capitals. Specifically, 
regardless of how extensive the family networks were, piaohao’s family style of 
capital raising was still circumscribed within the sources from relatives and kinships, 
which depended heavily on personal trust and credits. On the contrary, the capital 
raising method based on limited liability adopted by modern banks would absorb 
capitals from a much larger scale beyond the family scale. Besides that, modern banks 
had the rights to issue banknotes and government bonds, which immensely extended 
and mobilized their capital. Because of such a huge capital pool, modern banks could 
compete with Shanxi banks on remittance businesses, which piaohao were not able 
to.45 While Faure’s argument is too brief and without any actual primary source 
supporting it, he provides a particular yet fundamental angle to analyze the capital 
structures and characters of piaohao. This thesis would utilize Faure’s framework to 
content that a defective capital raising mode and structure leads to the decline of 
piaohao.  
                                                        
44 Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohaoshi, 58-80. 
45 David Faure, “Shanxi piaohao zai zhongguo yinhang shi de zuoyong [The historical significance of Shanxi 
piaohao in the Chinese banking history]”, in Zhang Zhengming et al ed., Zhongguo jinshang yanjiu [Studies on 
Shanxi merchants in China] (Beijing, Renmin chubanshe, 2006), 29-32. 
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None of the study in Chinese had drawn the link between the decline of piaohao 
and their limited working funds for remittance as well. Piaohao did not attach great 
importance to absorb every possible deposit from the public. This problem did not 
become fatal when piaohao were still able to gain available funds through dealing 
with official remittances and official silver repositories. However, this defect would 
eventually drain out their available capital sources and lead to the contraction of their 
remitting business after the Qing government gradually took control of its provincial 
treasuries and repositories after 1895.  
With regards to the internal relationships among those thirty Shanxi piaohao, 
only the Republican scholar Chen Qitian speculated that unlike the qianzhuang which 
had a guild, the decline of piaohao was due to the lack of a comprehensive guild that 
could provide multiple supports inside the piaohao.46 However, Chen’s argument was 
too brief to make it a convincing one. Other scholars such as Huang Jianhui and Shi 
Ruomin just simply divided the thirty piaohao into the Ping clique (pingbang), Qi 
clique (qibang) and Taigu clique (taigu bang), each according to the locations of their 
head offices, and assumed that the cliques had close internal contacts in terms of 
business operations.47 In reality, what Chen had previous noted was not the real case 
of piaohao’s internal contacts and is another factor attributing to the final decline of 
piaohao. Neither these thirty piaohao from Shanxi province nor those originated from 
the same county had ever formed a coherent financial community. Instead, they 
competed with each other in governmental remittance businesses, and did not own 
internal networks in their residential counties or external ones in their sojourning 
places where their branch offices were set up.  
This thesis also argues that the defections lied innately in the defective 
                                                        
46 Chen Qitian, Shanxi piaozhuang kaolue, 43-44.  
47 Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi, 107-113; Shi Ruomin, Piaoshang xingshuai shi, 84-5.  
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bookkeeping methods used by piaohao had resulted in their decline. Such method 
adopted by them is known as the sizhufa (four-column accounting). It was a common 
method which was also employed by other native Chinese firms such as the 
Ruifuxiang cloth shop during the Qing period. 48  David Faure argues that the 
“traditional Chinese accountants lacked the mechanics to keep track of capital”. 
Therefore, in the absence of capital accounting, “the annual profits as calculated from 
standard practices would have balanced income and expenditure but would have made 
no provision for bad debts or depreciation.”49 What Faure has contended would be 
very helpful for analyzing the drawbacks of sizhufa and its influence on the decline of 
piaohao. 
Finally, this thesis suggests that the evolution of the monetary system during the 
last few decades of the Qing dynasty is also a fatal blow to the survival of piaohao. 
Piaohao’s business foundation lied in the use of silver taels as the main currency in 
government revenue payments as well as other wholesale transactions. Thus, the 
frequency of using the remitting services provided by piaohao was inevitably 
decreased, when the Qing government began to mint silver dollars of their own, which 
made the transportation of money much easier than before. Moreover, using silver 
dollars made the profits of the piaohao from exchanging various fineness of the silver 
decreased. Thus, the monetary evolution and currency unification in late Qing China 
also contributed to the decline of the Shanxi piaohao. 
 
5. Notes on sources 
The primary sources used in this thesis are taken mainly from a sourcebook entitled 
Shanxi Piaohao Shiliao (Historical Materials of the Shanxi piaohao), published by the 
                                                        
48 Chan, “The organizational structure of the traditional Chinese firm and its modern reform”, The Business 
History Review, Vol. 56 (1982): 227. 
49 Faure, China and capitalism, 36-7.  
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Shanxi jingji chubanshe (Shanxi Economic Publishing House) in 2002. The chief 
editor is Huang Jianhui, who studies piaohao for over forty years. This A4-size 
sourcebook has more than 1,200 pages, and has collected almost all the available 
sources on piaohao. It is an eclectic collection of documents on the operation and 
evolution of piaohao from 1820s to 1911.  
This sourcebook mainly consists of three parts. The first part provides a 
government-centered perspective of piaohao’s development. It is consists of almost 
all the available memos from the central government and provincial bureaucracies, 
which recorded the official interactions with piaohao since 1840s. These documents 
are compiled in chronological order and further sub headed by topics, such as debates 
on whether adopting remittance as the primary method for provincial bureaucracies to 
submit their financial obligations to the central government during 1860s.  
The second part is a compilation of documents related to the institutions and 
organizations of piaohao. The sources for this section are rather diverse. Some of the 
documents are the oral recollections of people who had participated in some activities 
related to piaohao. These oral accounts were transcribed by mainland Chinese 
scholars during the 1960s.50 Other documents come from excerptions of the research 
works by Republican scholars such as Wei Juxian and Chen Qitian.51 It also includes 
excerpts from articles published by Republican scholars on newspapers or banking 
journals, such as on Yinhang Zhoubao (Bankers’ Weekly).52 Other sources come from 
the journals and ledgers left by piaohao.53 All these documents are important in 
understanding the capital and institutional structure, the staff recruitment and 
                                                        
50 See an example on a interview on Zhang Jinghao for the capital structure on piaohao in 1961, who once worked 
for subsidiary firms of Sanjingyuan piaohao, see SPS, 581. 
51 For an example on the study of piaohao’s bookkeeping categories, this sourcebook excerpted paragraphs from 
Wei Juxian and Chen Qitian’s book, see SPS, 615-6.  
52 For example, it excerpted from an article on the business scope of each piaohao by Donghai: Ji Shanxi piaohao 
[Notes on Shanxi piaohao], Yinhang zhoubao [Banking Weekly], Vol. 1, No. 7, 1917, see SPS, 635. 
53 For an example of a ledger made by Rishengchang piaohao’s Qingjiangpu branch in 1852, see SPS, 617.  
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management, the bookkeeping methods and the business operations of piaohao, and 
so on. 
The third part offers a piaohao-centered perspective of their development. It 
includes the business correspondences left by Rishengchang and Weitaihou piaohao. 
Among them, the ones left by Rishengchang piaohao, which take up more than 200 
pages of the sourcebook, are the most comprehensive. These letters cover the period 
from 1841 to 1900, and consist of correspondences between the twenty branches to 
their head office in Pingyao.54 In fact, since Rishengchang piaohao was the earliest 
and the most prosperous piaohao as compared with their thirty counterparts, this letter 
collection would be the most representative one to reflect the long-term transition of 
piaohao’s business trajectory. Letters left by Weitaihou piaohao dated from 1840s to 
1850s, and were correspondences between its Suzhou and Beijing branches.55 They 
are useful for understanding the early development of piaohao.  
 
6. Thesis overview 
This thesis has five main chapters. Chapter One, the introductory chapter, begins by 
defining the key terms, and providing the literature review and the origins of primary 
sources of this thesis. Chapter Two provides a detailed picture of the business 
management and operations of piaohao. Since piaohao’s operation has to be 
understood in the context of the entire Chinese financial market, this chapter will also 
offer some background information on other Chinese financial institutions such as 
qianzhuang and modern Chinese banks.  
                                                        
54 See the whole collection on letters by Rishengchang piaohao, see SPS, 833-1078. The correspondences left by 
Rishengchang includes the letters sent by Pingyao head office to its Beijing, Chongqing (Sichuan), Chengdu 
(Sichuan) , Changsha(Hunan), Guangzhou(Guangdong), Guilin(Guangxi), Hankou(Hubei), Hangzhou (Zhejiang), 
Kaifeng (Henan), Qingjiangpu (Jiangsu) , Shanghai, Suzhou (Jiangsu), Shashi (Hubei), Sanyuan (Shaanxi), Tianjin, 
Wuzhou (Guangxi), Xi’an (Shanxi), Xiangtan (Hunan),Yangzhou (Jiangsu); Zhoujiakou (Henan）branches, and 
letters sent by those branches to its head office.  
55 See the whole collection on letters by Weitaihou piaohao, see SPS, 1109-1212. 
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Chapter Three points out that the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64) provided a rare 
opportunity for the development of piaohao, because it provided them the chance to 
handle considerable amount of official remittances for various provincial 
bureaucracies of the Qing government. However, after discussing the place of 
piaohao in a network of local financial institutions, including qianzhuang, foreign 
banks, and remittance firms that were opened by non-Shanxi merchants, this chapter 
suggests that piaohao’s business niche was not carved out even after it served the 
Qing government. Thus, their roles in the Chinese financial market were hardly 
indispensable. 
Next, Chapter Four demonstrates that although piaohao developed rapidly for 
serving various provincial bureaucracies since 1860s, they did not gain as much 
benefits as what people had thought previously. Instead, they suffered from their 
interactions with the Qing government and were refrained from collaborating with 
them during its financial transition after 1895. However, the unprecedented financial 
transitions of Qing effected negatively on the survival of piaohao, which in fact 
accelerated their eventual decline. 
Finally, Chapter Five interprets the fundamental reasons for the decline of 
piaohao. Particularly, their limited and scattered capitals circumscribed their business 
scales, and further prevented them from competing with both the local qianzhuang 
and the modern banks. Their incoherent financial communities either inside or outside 
their residential localities in Shanxi further circumscribed their available capital 
sources. In addition, their problematic bookkeeping methods and their reliance on the 
chaotic bimetallic currency system also attributed to their final decline. This thesis 
concludes that the decline of piaohao was primarily due to their innately defective 
business styles instead of their over-reliance on the Qing government.  
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Chapter 2: The Profile of Shanxi piaohao and Other Contemporary Financial 
Institutions 
This chapter will begin by giving a business profile of piaohao. This refers to how 
they were organized, what their capital structures were like and how they operated and 
managed their remittance business. The basic facts on other financial institutions 
which co-existed with piaohao in late Qing dynasty China will also be introduced, 
such as remittance firms run by merchants other than those from the Shanxi province, 
qianzhuang, modern Chinese banks, and foreign banks. Such information is essential 
for constructing a comprehensive history of Shanxi piaohao, because the evolution of 
piaohao should be analyzed in the context of the whole Chinese financial market in 
the late imperial era.  
 
1. Capital source and structure of piaohao 
Piaohao’s capital structure was not different from qianzhuang and other native 
Chinese firms in the late Qing dynasty.56 All Shanxi piaohao were family businesses 
with single proprietorship or partnerships of two or more persons. The founding 
capitals were raised based on kinship and native-place ties, which depended heavily 
on personal trust. Each piaohao was initially started up from 100,000 to 300,000 
silver taels and each branch would not gain more than 10,000 silver taels as its 
working capital. This is with the exception of the head office in Shanxi province and 
some primary branches such as those located in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, which 
would get 30,000 silver taels as their founding capital.57  
Piaohao’s founding capital had two types. One was the basic capital (zhengben) 
                                                        
56 For the capital structures of qianzhuang, see McElderry, Shanghai old-style banks, 43; and other capital 
structures of Chinese family firms, see Wellington K. K. Chan, “The Organizational Structure of the Traditional 
Chinese Firm and Its Modern Reform”, The Business History Review, Vol. 56, No. 2, East Asian Business History 
(Summer, 1982): 219-22. 
57 SPS, 326, 581-2; also refer to Table 1. 
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or silver shares (yingu). It was the original funds put up by the founders of the 
piaohao, and the profit sharing was mainly based on those basic capitals. The actual 
amount of each share varied from piaohao to piaohao. For example, according to a 
founding contract of Zhichengxin piaohao in 1873, their basic capital was 34,000 
silver taels, with every 2,000 taels as one share. Another renewed contract by 
Weitaihou piaohao in 1879 revealed that their basic capital was 121,000 silver taels, 
with every 5,000 taels as one share.58 
The other type of piaohao’s founding capital is the supplementary capital (fuben) 
or protection capital (huben). It was added to the original capital by the owners, either 
in the form of deposits or as additional capital set aside. Though the basic capital was 
usually fixed, the supplementary part was highly variable since the owners of piaohao 
could withdraw their supplementary capital at any time. Thus it was difficult to 
determine the actual available capital for the running of the piaohao. 
Apart from the two types of capitals, personal shares (shengu) or man-power 
shares (renligu) were usually assigned to the senior staffs of piaohao. The personal 
shares did not contribute any actual amount of money to piaohao, but they shared the 
profits according to the percentages agreed upon in a contract like the basic shares. 
The supplementary capitals are not included during profit sharing processes.59  
 
2. Business operations of piaohao 
The essential function of piaohao was to deal with inter-provincial remittances. 
Piaohao initially provided remittance services for merchants who conducted 
interregional trades such as tea, silk and other cash crop trades. It later began to 
facilitate the purchase of degrees, ranks, posts from Beijing for people of various 
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provinces from 1840s. During and after the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64), piaohao 
gradually dealt with transmitting revenues and expenditures for various provincial 
bureaucracies of the Qing government. As a result, remittance commissions gradually 
became the primary source of piaohao’s profit. 
In addition to remittance charges, piaohao also gained a certain portion of profit 
by manipulation of the different scales and grades of silver. This was a unique source 
of profit brought by the highly nonuniform currencies of China. At times, piaohao 
also derived their incomes from loans and deposits of big merchants and firms. 
However, placing their primary reliance on government business and remittances, 
they did not involve themselves too closely with fortunes of the communities in which 
they had branches and considered ordinary banking business as marginal.60 
Piaohao transferred their remittance funds by using a financial instrument called 
huipiao, literally a draft, which could be cashed at any of their branches or by their 
correspondences throughout the country. For example, a person who wished to send 
money from Shanxi province to Tianjin would obtain a draft from the head office of 
piaohao in Shanxi. Such a draft would be stipulated for encashment only after a 
certain period of time, the time it took to remit money from one place to another. Then 
the person would take the draft with him and proceed to the Tianjin branch of the 
piaohao to redeem for cash. 
Piaohao invented many methods to avoid counterfeit of the draft. The most 
common one was the printing of watermarks such as the name of the piaohao on it. 
Sometimes piaohao had to mail the drafts to its other branches to inform them in 
advance. Since such drafts were carried by private mail delivery services, piaohao 
would then use codes in their drafts to avoid both the counterfeit and the disclosure of 
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business secrets. For example, Dadeheng piaohao used ten Chinese characters as a 
code. It composed a sentence to correspond to the numbers from one to ten. Those 
characters were “zhao shi lian cheng bi, you lai tian xia chuan” (literally “a priceless 
fine jade from the Zhao family, was handed down by numerous generations”). Here, 
the character “zhao” refers to the number “1”, and “shi” refers to the number “2”, so 
on and so forth. As a result, if 385 silver taels were to be remitted, Dadeheng piaohao 
would write down the amount in the draft as “lian tian bi”. Those codes were only 
known by the staff of the piaohao and would be changed after a certain period of time, 
so their business information would not be intercepted by outsiders.61 
 
Abundant floating funds were the prerequisites for the smooth transactions of 
piaohao’s remittance business. Their funding capital was definitely one of the sources 
for these funds. A second source was from funds deposited for future remittance by 
merchants who dealt with interregional wholesale trades. A third source was gained 
from the surplus silvers of local qianzhuang. The fourth source came from handling 
various official repositories of the Qing government, such as those of the Board of 
Revenue, the various Maritime Customs and so on.  
Specifically, the funds from interregional merchants facilitated a smooth 
transaction for official remittance for the government. In addition, utilizing their 
original founding capitals, gaining funds from local qianzhuang and handling various 
official repositories enhanced other remittance business for piaohao as well. However, 
the mechanisms of the two were different. Thus the following Figure 1 and Figure 2 
will demonstrate respectively how floating capitals from various sources enhanced the 
remittance business of piaohao. This would further illustrate the importance of 
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various floating capitals to their remittance business.  
 
Figure 1: A sample of how the floating capitals from merchants to facilitate the provincial 
remittance 
 
Figure 1 reveals the importance of floating funds gained from merchants for 
piaohao to conduct official remittances. The steps are as follows. Step one, a branch 
of a certain piaohao in Hunan province received 10,000 silver taels from the 
provincial government to remit to Beijing. Next, step two, its Beijing branch looked 
for merchant A in Beijing, who coincidentally needs to remit their money back to 
Hunan province at the same time. Step three, after gaining the actual amount of 
money from merchant A, the Beijing branch of piaohao had to submit the stipulated 
amount on behalf of the Hunan provincial government to the Board of Revenue. 
Finally, step four, the piaohao’s Hunan branch returned the 10,000 silver taels to 
merchant A’s agency in Hunan with the money they accepted from the Hunan 
provincial government previously. Through such flow of funds, this certain piaohao 
gained remittance commissions both from merchant A and the Hunan provincial 
government. 
However, if the Beijing branch was unable to find enough silver taels from 
○4  
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○3  ○1  
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merchants to meet the stipulated amount by its Hunan branch to submit to the Board 
of Revenue, it had to write to the head office in Shanxi to transfer the real silver 
sycees to Beijing in order to submit the provincial taxes on time. Thus, piaohao 
sometimes had to turn down remittance business offers from provincial governments 
because the silver transfer from Shanxi to Beijing usually took more time and money 
than the commissions paid by the provincial government. Since each piaohao’s ability 
to obtain floating funds from merchants was limited, the provincial government 
usually utilized more than one piaohao and some other qianzhuang to remit their 
financial quotas. Hence, each piaohao had to share a single bill of official remittance 
business with other financial institutions and was unable to monopolize it. 
In fact, whether piaohao could accept a bill from the provincial government 
depended heavily on how many floating funds they could obtain from merchants and 
mercantile firms. If they or the branch at the expected destinations did not have 
enough funds, they could not deal with such remittance. For example, in 1887, the 
Governor-General of Fujian and Zhejiang raised 100,000 silver taels as the relief 
funds for the floods in Henan. However, due to the recession of the local economy 
which strained the flow of local silver taels, all the branches of piaohao in Henan 
turned down such remittance demands, because they could not get the stipulated 
remittance amount to submit to the Henan government. Eventually, those relief funds 
were first encased and then transferred overland to Qingjiangpu at Jiangsu province, 
and were later picked up by the Henan officials.62 
 
Figure 2: A sample of how dealing with official treasuries and repositories facilitate piaohao’s 
remittance transfer 
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Figure 2 shows that utilizing the funds from various provincial treasuries and 
Maritime Customs would also enhance piaohao’s remittance businesses for the 
merchants. The mechanism could also be applied to explain how abundant funds from 
piaohao’s own funding capital or gaining support from local qianzhuang would 
facilitate piaohao’s remittance business. Specifically, as step 1 shows, merchant A 
wanted to remit 5,000 silver taels from Hunan province to Beijing. He thus delivered 
his money to piaohao’s Hunan branch. If piaohao’s Beijing branch did not handle part 
of the silvers from the repositories of the Board of Revenue, and there was no 
merchant B who coincidently wanted to remit his money back to Hunan, then most of 
the time, piaohao’s Hunan branch would not conduct the remittance for merchant A. 
This is because its Beijing branch had no floating funds to pay the stipulated amount 
to merchant A’s Beijing agency. Otherwise, piaohao’s Beijing branch would have to 
write to its Shanxi head office to transfer real silvers to Beijing which might cost more 
than commissions earned from merchant A. In that case, piaohao had not conducted 
remittance business and thus no profit to obtain at all.  
Fortunately, the piaohao’s Beijing branch handled some silvers from repositories 













A repository of 




the repository and pay merchant A’s Beijing agency, as shown in step 2 and 3. The 
piaohao could then wait until a merchant B in Beijing wanted to remit 5,000 taels 
back to Hunan, this is shown in step 4. In step 5, piaohao would be able to return the 
5,000 taels which it had previously “embezzled” from the repository of the Board of 
Revenue. In the meantime, merchant B’s Hunan agency would cash its draft, and 
piaohao’s Hunan branch would achieve this by using the money previously received 
from the remittance money of merchant A. With the assistance of the floating money 
gained through handling the repository of the official bureaucracies, piaohao thus 
conducted two remittance transactions and gained commissions twice from merchant 
A and B. This process explains why the original founding capitals, floating funds from 
qianzhuang and various official repositories were important for the remittance 
business expansion of piaohao.  
 
3. Management of piaohao 
The head offices of piaohao were located in the three counties of Qi, Taigu and 
Pingyao. In the heyday of piaohao’s operation during 1890s, about thirty piaohao 
existed within the Shanxi province. They were loosely organized into three groups 
corresponding to the three districts. They were sometimes known as the three groups 
of Ping, Qi and Tai County (pingqitai sanbang).63 Their actual internal relationships 
among those thirty piaohao would be delineated in Chapter Five.   
The piaohao’s branches throughout the country were administered by a 
centralized system under the supervision of their head offices. Such supervision was 
realized through the intensive reporting system through frequent business 
correspondences between head offices and its various branches.64 In addition, every 
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branch had to report their business transactions both on a monthly and yearly basis, 
known as the Monthly Clearance (yueqing) and Year-end Summary (nianzongjie) 
respectively. Each branch would also report to each other their monthly business 
conditions.65 
The shareholders of piaohao usually did not involve in the daily operation of 
piaohao. Instead, they appointed managers (zhanggui, literally “holder of counter”) to 
run their head offices and branches. Besides the managers, both the head office and 
the branches had accountant, street runner, cashier, amanuensis and apprentices. The 
managers supervised the daily business of the head office or the other branches and 
took the sole responsibility over the operation of the piaohao. He hired assistants, 
selected and supervised apprentices, and thus established a sense of paternal authority 
over his staff.66 However, no matter how powerful the manger was, he did not have 
the final decision in making fundamental changes to the piaohao’s business styles. 
This could be further illustrated in Chapter Four when it discusses the reforms 
proposed by Li Hongling in 1908, a manager of Weifenghou piaohao. As Wellington 
Chan once commented: “[T]he Chinese managers, though still maintaining their full 
authority in running the business, could not turn their man-labor shares into regular 
capital, much less increase them. Their social status was still dependent on the 
owners.” 67 
 
As for the staff recruitment, piaohao employed only the natives of Shanxi 
province. Once selected, those staffs had to stay at the various branches located 
outside their residential villages for up to three years. The branch staffs were not 
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allowed to visit their families during the course of their three-year appointment. In 
addition, when a man was assigned to a post at one of the branch offices, his family is 
taken charge of by the piaohao and held as hostage to ensure his fidelity and good 
behavior.68 
 
4. Other financial institutions co-existed with piaohao 
Remittance firms owned by non-Shanxi merchants 
After Shanxi piaohao began to conduct provincial remittance, their business scales 
expanded greatly since 1850s. Rich merchants from other provinces also opened up 
financial firms which could handle inter-provincial remittance. Those firms also 
established branches in the major cities of China. Fukang and Hutongyu remittance 
firms were opened in 1860s by the prominent Zhejiang gentry-merchant Hu 
Guangyong (Hu Xueyan). The Tianshunxiang remittance firm was invested by 
Yunnan merchants with its head office in Kunming, the Yunnan province, around the 
1870s. It focused primarily on the official remittances for the Yunnan government. In 
addition, in 1883, Yan Xinhou, a native Jiangsu gentry-merchant, established the 
Yuanfengrun remittance firm with its head office in Shanghai.69 These remittance 
firms owned by non-Shanxi merchants had the same business functions as Shanxi 
piaohao. In addition, they had some characters of qianzhuang, including making loans 
to support the local financial market, absorbing deposits, financing local wholesale 
merchants, and so on.  
As for the appellation of the remittance firms owned by non-Shanxi merchants, it 
was discursive and not unified from the very beginning. For instance, according to the 
official Qing documents, such as the memos from the Board of Revenue, they 
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regarded the Fukang remittance firm opened by Hu Guangyong as silver house 
(yinhao).70 Li Hongzhang also considered Fukang as yinhao.71 However, in the 
contemporary newspapers, the appellation of Fukang was rather confused. In a report 
by Shenbao on 9 December 1883, it regarded Fukang as a yinhao, while its report on 
26 December 1883 considered Fukang as a piaohao. 72  The mainland Chinese 
scholars also had differing opinions towards the official names of those remittance 
firms owned by non Shanxi merchants. Huang Jianhui preferred to call them 
“Southern Clique Piaohao” (nanbang piaohao). 73  However, the comprehensive 
sourcebook on Shanghai qianzhuang compiled by the Shanghai branch of the People’s 
Bank’s in 1961 categorized Fukang remittance firm as qianzhuang.74 
In this thesis, in order to avoid confusion and to distinguish them from the 
piaohao owned by Shanxi merchants, although those remittance firms such as Fukang 
or Tianshunxiang could be call as “Southern Clique Piaohao”, they were named as 
“remittance firms owned by non-Shanxi merchants” instead. Thus, the term 
“piaohao” would be retained to call piaohao which originated from Shanxi province 
only.  
Qianzhuang 
The initial rise of qianzhuang was a response to the changing demands between 
money exchanges caused by the emergence of a bimetallic currency system of copper 
coins and silver taels during the late imperial time. The business scopes of qianzhuang 
were complementary to that of piaohao but distinct from it. Piaohao specialized in the 
remittance of funds by draft between branches of the same bank, while local 
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qianzhuang did not have branches, and they mainly conducted local money exchange, 
accepted deposits, made loans, issued cash notes, exchanged bills and notes, and 
discounted for the local business community.75 Qianzhuang were not of the same 
sizes. The paid-up capitals of qianzhuang could vary from 50,000 to only 500-1,000 
silver taels. Generally, they were initially capitalized about 5,000-10,000 silver taels.76 
Qianzhuang existed in almost every part of China. However, their names varied 
in different parts of the country. For example, in Beijing and Tianjin, qianzhuang were 
known as yinhao or qianpu, unlike in Shanghai and Hankou where they were called 
qianzhuang. 77  Though the appellations of “cash shops” were different between 
Northern and Southern China, their operational characters were essentially the same. 
As a result, this thesis would adopt the term “qianzhuang” as a universal appellation 
for firms and shops which dealt with the businesses stated above.  
Foreign banks  
The earliest foreign bank in China was the Oriental Banking Corporation, a British 
bank, opened in Shanghai in 1848. Since then, the British enjoyed forty years of 
virtual monopoly over the foreign banking business in China. Later in the 1890s, 
German, Japanese, Russian and French banks pushed into the China market as part of 
their growing international rivalry for spheres of interest. American banks entered 
China in 1902.78 
The foreign banks operated entirely freely from the Chinese laws. They were 
also largely free from their own national regulations. The largest part of their credit 
business was the financing of foreign trade. After 1895, they began to offer loans to 
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the Qing government to pay war indemnities. Thus, they were able to handle a 
considerable amount of money from the Chinese customs and salt revenues which had 
become pledges against foreign loans. They also issued bank notes which were 
circulated freely in the country. However, this practice later declined along as a result 
of the improvement in the Chinese national currency.79 
Modern Chinese banks 
The birth of the first modern Chinese bank was the result of China’s new financial 
demands. The existing financial intuitions such as qianzhuang and piaohao could not 
meet China’ new financial demands, such as support the modern industries and the 
construction of infrastructures, which needed large amounts of capital for long periods 
of time. Besides, consciousness of foreign banks’ intrusion into the Chinese financial 
market was another factor which contributed to the appearance of the first modern 
Chinese bank.80 
In 1897, the Imperial Bank of China (Zhongguo tongshang yinhang) was 
established in Shanghai based on the principles of modern western banks; it received a 
1,000,000-tael loan from the Board of Revenue as part of its founding capitals. It 
marked the beginning of China’s modern banking history. Since it was backed up by 
large capital sources and official patronage, this bank quickly earned its reputation in 
the Chinese financial market.81 
In 1904, the Bank of the Board of Revenue (Hubu yinhang) was set up with a 
capital of 4 million silver taels. It reorganized and upgraded into the Great Qing Bank 
(Daqing yinhang) in 1908, and its founding capital was increased to 10 million silver 
taels, which would be subscribed by the government and the public respectively. The 
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Great Qing Bank was the first central bank that was ever established in China. It was 
granted many exclusive privileges to control the China’s financial market, such as 
issuing banknotes which would gradually replaced all existing banknotes, handling 
the state treasury, assuming inter-provincial remittance business previous conducted 
by piaohao, transferring and managing foreign loans and state revenues, and so on.82 
 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates the organization and management of the piaohao. It also 
describes how they utilized the various sources of funds to facilitate their remittance 
business. In addition, this chapter examines the other financial institutions that 
co-existed with piaohao during the late Qing period. They serve as the background for 
understanding the following chapters, especially for Chapter Three and Four, which 
would focus on the roles played by the piaohao in governmental remittances and in 
the whole of Chinese financial market from the 1840s to 1911.  
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Chapter 3: The Origins of piaohao and their Operations Before 1895 
Shanxi piaohao were first established to cater to the remittance needs of the overland 
mercantile trades conducted by Chinese merchants, such as tea trades from Hubei, 
Hunan provinces to Russia and inner/outer Mongolia, and other cash crop trades 
within the hinterlands after 1820s. This occurred during the period when transferring 
of large sums of silver became more dangerous and costly due the increasing internal 
insurgencies. However, such trades declined after 1850s when the foreign merchants 
could conduct the hinterland trades directly with privileges gained from series of 
treaties with Qing government. This forced piaohao to seek more remittance business 
opportunities.  
The Taiping Rebellion (1850-64) provided such chance for piaohao, during 
which the traditional method of transferring silver bullions overland from various 
provinces to Beijing were blocked by the rebellious army. Hence, those provinces had 
to resort to the remittance services provided by piaohao as an alternative method. 
Moreover, during and after the Taiping Rebellion, the central government called for 
more national revenues from the provincial governments and customs than before. 
This also generated more remittance chances for piaohao in terms of the total money 
they could remit. Consequently, piaohao seized the opportunities for official 
remittance business and their roles in the remittance market were greatly reinforced 
and gradually prospered after the 1850s. 
Nevertheless, the piaohao never carved out their unique niches in the Chinese 
financial market even in the realms of remittance market. In fact, from the very 
beginning, latent challenges went through the course of the development of piaohao. 
Stiff remittance competitions came not only internally from piaohao, but also from 
other remittance firms owned by non-Shanxi merchants, competent qianzhuang and 
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foreign banks. Moreover, these financial institutions established their own unique 
niches in the Chinese financial market which the piaohao did not possess.  
 
1. The rise and decline of Shanxi piaohao’s original remittance business for 
indigenous traders 
Shanxi Piaohao’s initial purpose was to serve the remittance needs of the indigenous 
traders, including those who conducted tea trades between Hubei, Hunan and border 
towns in Mongolia and Russia, and other inter-provincial cash crop trades such as silk, 
cotton, dyestuffs and tung oil. Piaohao’s early stages of development from 1820-1850 
relied heavily on these traders. Particularly, Rishengchang, the earliest and biggest 
Shanxi piaohao, depended on the overland trade of brick tea from the production 
centers in the south to the northern distribution centers, and onwards to their final 
markets in Russia. A letter from the Pingyao head office to its Guangzhou branch in 
1861 revealed that in order to facilitate the tea trades between Hubei, Hunan and 
Zhangjiakou, as known as the Eastern Gateway (dongkou), the main distributing tea 
center of tea trades with Russia and Mongolia, they planned to resume their 
remittance business there and decide to set up a branch again.83 Its Pingyao head 
office also arranged the remittance business for the tea traders doing business between 
Shanxi and Hubei, Hunan province in advance as well. It predicted that the tea trades 
in the next year would prosper, and this would earn them a considerable commission 
from the tea traders by cashing their remittance drafts in Hankou. Thus, the Pingyao 
head office had tried to arrange more funds flowing to its Hankou branch in order to 
meet its intensive encashment needs in the following year.84 
Weitaihou piaohao also depended on trades such as silk, tea and tung oil. In fact, 
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the predecessor of it was a silk firm dealing with silk trades between Suzhou and 
Beijing.85 According to a letter dated around 1844-45 written by its Suzhou branch, 
during the early years of its operation, one of its service centers was in Suzhou. It was 
there to meet the remittance needs of the silk traders from Beijing.86 Besides, it also 
provided remittance services to tea, cotton, tung oil and grain shipment traders during 
the years from 1844 to 1852.87 
However, the development of foreign firms resulted in the collapse of Chinese 
distance trades in commodities since the 1850s. After the free-trade treaty system 
gradually established after 1842, foreign mercantile houses prospered and rivaled 
intensively against the upcountry purchase of tea and silk for export. Such upcountry 
purchase system soon became institutionalized after 1856.88 Furthermore, after 1870s, 
both the Chinese tea and silk trades were incorporated into the larger world economic 
market, which prices fluctuated according to the world market and responded quickly 
to changes in demand and supply.89 To make matters worse, Chinese tea lost the 
ground on the world market, encountering stiff competition from Japan and Ceylon 
after the mid-1870s. Silk also its lost ground in the world market during the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. By the turn of the century, it was Japan that rapidly 
overtook China and became the leading supplier of silk in the world market.90 
Numerous reports from the Qing officials would evidence this deteriorating 
situation of the Chinese cash crop traders. For example, Liu Kunyi noted in 1881 that 
after Russian merchants gained the trading privilege, they opened up tea firms in 
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Hankou directly, loaded their steamships with black tea and brick tea and shipped 
them first from Hankou to Tianjin and then directly to Russia. This greatly reduced 
the transportation costs and overshadowed the tea trades dominated previously by 
Chinese merchants.91 The inspector of Zhangjiakou Customs further reported on 26 
September 1897 that the previous customs revenue came mainly from tea transported 
from southern provinces to be exported, and hides, leather and livestock to be 
imported from Kyakhta, both of which were mainly conducted by Chinese merchants. 
However, after the Russian merchants gained the tax-free trade rights which allowed 
them to buy and sell the tea in bulks without paying taxes in China, most of the 
indigenous Chinese merchants who dealt with such trades before went out of business, 
and the Customs revenue of Zhangjiankou decreased dramatically as well.92 
In sum, after the 1850s, the indigenous Chinese merchants who conducted 
inter-provincial trades on tea, silk and other cash crops were negatively impacted due 
to the stiff competitions from the foreign mercantile firms. They further passively 
suffered from the fluctuations through the integration of the world cash crop market. 
The decline of Chinese overland trade further contributed to the decline of piaohao’s 
remittance business, whose initial development heavily relied on serving them. 
Piaohao thus have to seek other opportunities to make more profits from then on.  
 
2. Piaohao began to conduct official remittances since 1860s 
With the increase in internal and external chaos in China after 1850, piaohao seized 
the chance to expand their remittance business scale, shifting their market base from 
Chinese overland wholesale merchants to the Qing government. These business 
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opportunities had two connotations. On the one hand, various provinces gradually 
replaced the overland method of transferring silver by remitting the money via 
piaohao due to various safety concerns after 1850. On the other hand, after 1850s, the 
Qing central government appealed for more money from respective provincial 
bureaucracies either to pacify the internal rebellions or to promote the 
Self-Strengthening Movement, which greatly expanded the available amounts that 
could be conducted by the piaohao as well. 
Before the Taiping Rebellion, the prevailing method of submitting Capital 
Acquisition (jingxiang) to Beijing and Assistance Funds (xiexiang) to various 
provinces adopted by Qing government was as follows. Every 1,000 silver taels were 
packed and fastened into a wooden sharp box with iron hoops, known as the 
Encasement of Silver (xianyin zhuangqiao). Each encasement weighed about 31.5 
kilograms. It was then submitted to Beijing escorted by provincial appointees and 
troops.93  
Qing government firmly adhered to such method until the early times of Taiping 
Rebellion. No one had the right to alter this method of transferring silver without 
endorsement from the government. In 1848, the appointee of the silver escort from the 
Zhejiang provincial treasury remitted 4,600 silver taels to Beijing without official 
authorization. After his misdemeanor was uncovered, the appointee was removed 
from his post. 94 
However, such method of submitting the allocated money was soon in jeopardy 
in the final stage of the Taiping Rebellion. In May 1860, the rebellious army besieged 
Nanjing, and later battled with Qing troops in Hubei, Jiangxi, Anhui and Zhejiang. In 
addition, the Nian Army harassed Jiangsu, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Shandong, Shanxi 
                                                        
93 Huang Jianhui, Shanxi piaohao shi, 230, 265; Zhang Guohui, Wanqing qianzhuang he piaohao yanjiu, 83. 
94 SPS, 74-75. 
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and Hebei provinces. These internal insurgencies severely blocked the previous 
overland routes for transferring money to Beijing.95 Thus, the submission of the 
Capital Requisition to Beijing was disastrously delayed due to the fear of the 
rebellious army and to the penalty for altering the fixed submission method. Finally, 
because Board of Revenue desperately needed the national revenues from various 
provinces, they had no other choice but to lift the ban on submitting the Capital 
Requisition through remittance firms in 1862.96 
Several polarizing debates happened between the censors and provincial 
governors after the Board of Revenue lifted the ban on submitting Capital Requisition 
via remittance. In 1864, Censors in Beijing opposed it for the reason that remitting 
silver to submit provincial quotas would cause a strain in the silver market of the 
Capital because no actual silvers were transported to Beijing. On the contrary, various 
Governor-Generals and provincial governors, especially the ones from Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Fujian provinces, ignored such appeals with the practical concerns that 
submitting provincial quotas through the previous Encasement method was at high 
risk due to the continuous internal rebellious. Moreover, sometimes they could not 
raise the allocated quota before the due date. As a result, they needed the piaohao and 
other remittance firms to remit the quota in advance and repay them later.97 Besides, 
the appeals on banning the remittance also reiterated in 1876, 1883, and 1899 either 
by censors or the Board of Revenue with the same reason listed above. However, all 
such appeals were also ignored by the various provinces. Those reversions did not 
shake the dominant role of submitting Capital Requisitions and other provincial funds 
through remittances after 1862.98 
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97 SPS, 166-74. 
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As mentioned earlier, one reason for piaohao’s business expansion was due to 
the military insecurity of the late Qing period. Another reason was because of the 
central government’s increasing needs for more money from each province as the 
Capital Requisition during and after the Taiping Rebellion, which generated more 
remittance business chances for piaohao.  
As soon as the ban on submitting provincial quotas via remittance was lifted in 
the 1860s, various provinces and customs quickly resorted to Shanxi piaohao and 
other remittance firms to remit allocations such as the Capital Requisition, Assistance 
Funds, Expenditures for the Self-Strengthening Movements, relief funds, and other 
temporary allocations to the various designated destinations according to the central 
government’s appeals.99 Among them, Fujian, Guangdong, Sichuan and Zhejiang 
provincial governments and their respective customs relied much more heavily on the 
remittances services than other provinces, because they had to submit larger amounts 
of money to Beijing. For example, according to the remained sporadic data, the 
provincial government of Fujian and Guangdong asked the piaohao and other 
remittance firms to remit 1,304,526 and 1,446,790 silver taels respectively in 1880, 
while in the same year, the amount remitted by Shandong provincial government was 
only 10,000 taels.100 It might probably because those Southern provinces were the 
most important sources of revenue for the Qing government. 
After the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895, it further increased 
with the payment of indemnities to the foreign powers. Since then, the Qing 
government had to borrow money from the banking consortiums, consisting of Russia, 
France, British and Germany, to pay the war indemnities to Japan. The total amount 
                                                        
99 SPS, 80-109. 
100 SPS, 127-131. This is a statistic table on amount remitted by various provincial governments and Customs 
from 1862-1893. Though it was based on sporadic data remained currently, it still provides convincing evidence 
and a brief yet comprehensive picture on the remittance business situations. However, one point needed to be noted 
here that those data not only includes the amount conducted by Shanxi piaohao, it also already consisted the 
amount dealt by other remittance firms and even local qianzhuang. 
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repaid to those consortiums was 12,000,000 silver taels per annum. The Board of 
Revenue assumed to pay 2,000,000 taels from its own revenues, such as the Capital 
Requisitions, and the remaining 10,000,000 taels were then allocated to the various 
provinces and customs. 101  Particularly, Guangdong province and Guangdong 
Maritime Customs (yuehaiguan) were assigned totally 2,180,000 silver taels; Hubei 
province and Hubei Customs (jianghanguan) was assigned 1,000,000 silver taels 
altogether; Fujian and its Maritime Customs were assigned 740,000 silver taels; 
Shanghai Maritime Customs (jianghaiguan) was assigned 1,000,000 silver taels and 
Zhejiang province and its Customs (zhehaiguan) were assigned 1,000,000 silver taels, 
and Jiangsu province and Zhenjiang circuit (zhenjiangdao, in the south of Jiangsu 
Province) were assigned 1,060, 000 silver taels.102  
All such loan repayment had to be submitted to the Shanghai Maritime Customs, 
and the latter would gather them all, and remit the repayment to the foreign banking 
consortiums.103 Thus, piaohao and other remittance firms assumed the duty to remit 
the repayments for indemnity loans on behalf of the provincial governments to 
Shanghai then.104 
After 1900, the Qing government was burdened with another indemnity, having 
to pay the compensation for losing to the Eight-Power Allied Forces (baguo lianjun) 
following the Boxer Uprising. The Board of Revenue again allocated the loan 
repayments to the respective provinces and Customs.105 Piaohao and other remittance 
                                                        
101 Hubu [Board of Revenue], “Yizou gesheng tanpai chouhuan yangkuan shu议奏各省摊派筹还洋款疏 [The 
memorandum on the repayments of foreign loans by respective provinces]”, in SPS, 221. 
102 See the statistic table for the particular assigned amounts that each province and Customs needed to assume, in 
SPS, 222. 
103 Hubu [Board of Revenue], “Yizou gesheng tanpai chouhuan yangkuan shu议奏各省摊派筹还洋款疏 [The 
memorandum on the repayments of foreign loans by respective provinces]”, in SPS, 221. 
104 SPS, 223-5. 
105 Hubu [Board of Revenue], “ Zou xinding peikuan shuju, qi ying heli tongchou shu奏新定赔款数巨期急应合
力通筹疏[The memorandum on the imperative duties to repay the indemnities collectively]”, in SPS, 233-4. 
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firms again provided remittance services to meet such the official remittance needs.106 
Moreover, the chaos of the time increased the government’s dependence on the 
piaohao in other ways. During the 1900, the Empress Dowager Cixi and the Emperor 
Guangxu were forced to flee from the besieged Beijing to Xi’an, Shaanxi province. 
Thus, the Capital Requisition had to be remitted to Shaanxi alternatively. Piaohao 
were then the only appropriate firms which could assume such duty since they were 
adjacent to Xi’an. Thus they could gain access to various sources of funds to meet the 
official remittance needs.107 
The letters left by Rishengchang piaohao could further evidence that the 
piaohao’s remittance business gained a remarkable development through serving 
various provincial bureaucracies after the 1860s. Before that, Rishengchang mainly 
served the inter-provincial cash crop traders. Their letters of the year 1841-42 and 
1851-61 revealed that during that period, business of its Zhangjiakou and Guangzhou 
branch was still mainly focused on serving tea trades. 108  However, its 
correspondences during the Guangxu reign (1875-1908) disclosed that their primary 
business scope has shifted to primarily conduct official remittances for various 
provincial bureaucracies. 109  Three characteristics concerning Rishengchang’s 
remittance service for the provincial government need to be pointed out here.  
In the first place, as compared to Rishengchang’s other hinterland branches, its 
branches in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Hangzhou, and Chongqing handled more 
remittances for provincial bureaucracies, such as Provincial Treasury in Guangdong 
(guangdong fanku), Brokerage tax Bureau (yaliju) in Shanghai, and Indigenous 
Opium tax Bureau (tushuiju) in Chongqing. Those remittance destinations were either 
                                                        
106 SPS, 234-38. 
107 See a telegraph sent by Hunan provincial governor Yu Liansan on August 8 1900, in SPS, 231-2. 
108 “Letters from Zhangjiakou to Beijing and Hankou”, in SPS, 841-6; “Letters from Pingyao head office to its 
Guangzhou branch”, in SPS, 847-57. 
109 “Letters during 1889-1893”, in SPS 865-982; “Letters during 1894-99”, in SPS, 983-1057. 
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in Beijing or cities in provinces. 110  However, those branches located at the 
hinterlands and upcountry such as Xi’an, Kaifeng and Zhoujiakou (a county in 
southeast Henan province) still mainly focused on inter-firm remittances.111  
The the second place, although Rishengchang piaohao obtained large amounts of 
remittance business from the government, it never gave up the petty remittance 
transactions. For example, a letter written by its Beijing branch around 1890, reported 
that its Shanghai branch remitted 30,000 silver taels to Beijing as the Capital 
Requisition to the Board of Revenue on behalf of Zhenjiang circuit, while the Guilin 
branch remitted only 19 taels for a person named Lu Shaoguo.112 Such stark contrast 
illustrates the importance of the official remittance business was to piaohao and also 
indicated that Rishengchang was keen on every available remittance business even it 
was a very petty one. 
Finally, the purpose of Rishengchang piaohao to conduct official remittance was 
to gain profits rather than to court favor with the Qing government. For example, 
around the 1890s, the Hangzhou branch remitted some money to the Brokerage 
Bureau in Tianjin and received 33 silver taels as the charges for remittance.113 Its 
Hangzhou branch also remitted 20,000 silver taels to the Shanghai Maritime Customs 
and received a remittance fee of 40 silver taels.114 Its Guangzhou branch submitted 
20,000 silver taels to the Navy Bureau in Tianjin and gained a commission of 97 
silver taels for every 1,000 taels remitted.115  
    In sum, numerous evidences either from the official Qing records or from the 
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piaohao’s business letters have shown that Shanxi piaohao did catch the chances 
brought by the chaotic times during the late imperial times. It was only during and 
after the Taiping Rebellion that the remittance businesses of piaohao began to prosper 
through conducting remittance for the various Qing provincial bureaucracies. 
 
3. Latent challenges for piaohao from the very beginning 
Although the role of piaohao in the Chinese remittance market was reinforced and 
became more significant after 1850, its role should not be exaggerated. In reality, 
Shanxi piaohao never carved out their business niches in the remittance and financial 
market in late Qing China. 
First of all, no single piaohao monopolized the remittance of provincial funds 
remittance businesses from the very beginning, for one bill of the provincial 
remittance business was always conducted and shared by several Shanxi piaohao 
themselves, local qianzhuang, and remittance firms owned by non-Shanxi merchants. 
Thus, each Shanxi piaohao’s remittance scale for the provincial government was very 
limited, and they had to compete with their counterparts intensively. Secondly, 
piaohao’s limited role also implies that they could not penetrate into the local 
financial markets where their branches located. This is due to the clannish sentiments 
of the local people where they established branches particularly in Southern China. 
Thus, piaohao were not always the patrons for the local qianzhuang. Instead, they 
sometimes had to rely on qianzhuang to get their floating funds. Thirdly, although the 
initial operations of foreign banks did not overlap and collided with the piaohao, they 
gradually took a share in the remittance market. Also, they provided services and 
supports to the Chinese financial market that the piaohao did not have either the 
competence or the motivation to do.  
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Competitions for official remittance business  
Although providing remittance services to the various provinces were a huge business 
for the piaohao, no single firm ever dominated the official remittance business of an 
entire province’s remittance businesses. Piaohao had to compete with their 
counterparts, and they also had to face the stiff competitions from other remittance 
firms and even the large local qianzhuang. 
From 1860s to 1911, there were about thirty Shanxi piaohao which could 
conduct the provincial remittance businesses.116  As a result, the most frequent 
scenario in remitting official funds is that the several piaohao shared and conducted a 
single official bill for a certain provincial bureaucracy. For example, in 1877, Jiangxi 
asked Sanjinyuan and Xintaihou piaohao to remit 10,000 silver taels as the funds for 
Coastal Defense Expenditure (haifang jingfei) to Zhili and Fujian province 
respectively. 117  In 1886, Sichuan raised 100,000 silver taels for the Navy 
Expenditures, and asked Baichuantong, Rishengchang and other seven remittance 
firms to remit it to the Navy Bureau (haijun yamen) in Beijing.118 In 1890, five 
piaohao remitted 50,000 silver taels as the funds for the railroad construction on 
behalf of the Guangdong provincial government to Beijing. By the same token, 
Sichuan asked nine Shanxi remittance firms to remit their quotas to Beijing which 
included 50,000 silver taels for the railroad expenditure.119 In 1900, Hunan province 
remitted 100,000 silver taels as its quota for the Capital Requisition by utilizing nine 
Shanxi piaohao. This means that each of the piaohao on the average only conducted 
about 10,000 silver taels.120 Besides these few cases, far more memorials left by 
provincial governors could also indicate that the normal course for provincial 
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119 SPS, 84. 
120 SPS, 232. The nine piaohao are: Rishengchang, Tianchengheng, Baichuantong, Xintaihou, Weifenghou, 
Weitaihou, Weishengchang, Xietongqing, and Qianshengheng. 
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governments was to submit remittances through a number of firms working 
together. 121  As such, no single Shanxi piaohao could monopolize the official 
remittance business for the provincial bureaucracies. 
After the central government endorsed remittance as the method to submit the 
various official funds in the 1860s, other remittance firms invested and operated by 
merchants from other provinces, rather than from Shanxi, bloomed immediately and 
thus also seized a considerable part of the official remittance business. Around the 
year 1863, the prominent Zhejiang gentry-merchant Hu Guangyong (Hu Xueyan) 
opened the Fukang and Hutongyu remittance firms, which engaged in the official 
remittance business like piaohao. Their branches located in Beijing, Shanghai, 
Zhenjiang, Ningbo, Hangzhou, Fuzhou and some others cities in Hubei and Hunan 
provinces.122 Since Hu Guangyong cultivated both an entrenched private and official 
relationship with Zuo Zongtang, his remittance firms soon dealt with a considerable 
amount of official remittances. 123  Particularly, Fukang and Hutongyu were the 
predominant remittance firms conducting official businesses from Fujian and 
Zhejiang provinces.124 In 1866, Fukang remittance firm remitted more than 940,000 
silver taels as the Capital Requisition on behalf of various provincial bureaucracies.125  
Besides Fukang and Hutongyu remittance firms, Yunnan merchants opened the 
Tianshunxiang remittance firm around the year 1875, with its head office in Kunming. 
They also set up various branches in Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, Fuzhou, Hankou 
and Chongqing.126 Since then, it almost monopolized the official remittances in and 
out of Yunnan province and was also very active in dealing with remittances from 
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125 SPS, 741. 
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other southern provinces such as Sichuan and Fujian.127 
In 1883, Yan Xinhou, a native Jiangsu gentry-merchant, opened the Yuanfengrun 
remittance firm, with its head office in Shanghai.128 After its opening, it soon 
undertook a considerable amount of official remittances, especially those from 
southern provinces, such as Zhejiang, Fujian and Guangdong.129 A report by Shenbao 
on 8 November 1891 indicated that although the Yuanfengrun only settled down in 
Xiamen not long ago, it had already made a quick profit.130 Another case is that in 
1904, it remitted 110,000 silver taels from Zhejiang to Shanghai Maritime Customs as 
the loan repayment to Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).131 
In addition, almost every major local qianzhuang had the ability to handle a 
considerable part of the provincial remittance business. Thus, the remittance market 
for the government was saturated and highly competitive. By and large, almost all the 
southern provinces such as Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces had 
once asked their various local qianzhuang to remit funds either to Beijing or other 
destinations such as Shanghai to repay the war indemnities rather than solely relied on 
Shanxi piaohao to do this all through the period from 1860s to 1911.132  
Here are more specific examples. In 1865, Sichuan province submitted 60, 000 
silver taels of the salt tax to the central government as the Capital Requisition through 
four Shanxi piaohao and two local qianzhuang. 133  In 1891, Zhejiang province 
submitted 50,000 silver taels of salt tax to Beijing through four Hangzhou qianzhuang, 
without inviting any piaohao to do it.134 In 1902, Jiangsu province remitted their 
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regular payment to the central court through a qianzhuang called Yuyuan.135 In the 
year 1908, Shanghai Maritime Customs submitted their customs revenue through the 
assistance of a qianzhuang named Dechenghou.136  
It was due to such stiff competition that in 1906, the Ministry of Finance 
(duzhibu) disseminated a memo to the respective provinces appealing for a reduction 
of the remittance commissions. It explained that during the previous years, not many 
remittance firms could handle the provincial funds either submitted to Beijing or to 
other provinces. However, at that point in time, remittance firms were great in 
numbers and the current charges for remittance had been greatly lowered down. Thus, 
various provinces should no longer adhere to the previous high commission 
standards.137 
In fact, it is probably because since that the remittance businesses provided by 
piaohao had not been distinctively different from other remittance firms and local 
qianzhuang, sometimes in the provincial governor’s memorials, they did not provide 
the full list of all the piaohao’s name to indicate which would conduct this bill of 
remittance. Instead, they only casually used the terms such as “xishang” (Shanxi 
merchants) or “xihao” (Shanxi firms) as a general description.138 This shows that the 
provincial governments had no preferences to entrust their funds to any particular 
piaohao. Their primary concern was just to fulfill the government’s orders without 
any delay or mistake. 
In sum, as Shanxi piaohao gained more remittance businesses from provincial 
governments, other Chinese financial institutions such as the big qianzhuang and 
other remittance firms invested by non-Shanxi merchants also followed their footsteps 
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in seizing a part of the official remittance transactions. In the meantime, piaohao had 
to compete for remittance businesses with their counterparts. Thus, Shanxi piaohao 
never monopolized the official remittance market.  
Piaohao’s inability in financial markets of the southern provinces  
Besides the intensified competitions for official remittance with other Chinese 
financial institutions, the branches of piaohao especially those located in southern 
China also encountered difficulties to penetrate into the local financial markets due to 
the diverse southern dialects and local customs. In fact, the relations between piaohao 
and qianzhuang in the local financial market need more careful examinations. On the 
one hand, piaohao played prominent roles in northern China, which supported local 
qianzhuang and thus were their patrons, especially in Beijing and Tianjin. The reason 
for that was because Beijing was a place where silver would accumulate through the 
Capital Requisition by respective provinces. As a result, piaohao could easily get 
enough floating funds to re-loan quickly to local qianzhuang. Moreover, as compared 
to piaohao’s branches in southern provinces, their northern branches were more 
adjacent to their clearing centers in Shanxi province. Thus, piaohao could also utilize 
the abundant funds from their native places to inject into the local financial markets.  
Specifically, qianzhuang in Tianjin had to depend on the floating funds provided 
by the piaohao. That situation was evidenced after the invasion of Eight-Power Allied 
Forces in 1900, when most of the local qianzhuang closed down and could not repay 
the short-term loans from piaohao. However, the latter forced qianzhuang to do so 
immediately, which caused a panic soon after. As a result, local qianzhuang in Tianjin 
had to petition to the Zhili government for a moratorium accordantly to pacify the 
local financial market.139  
                                                        
139 SPS, 296-7; also see discussions by Zhang Guohui, Wangqing qianzhuang he piaohao yanjiu, 111. 
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As to the southern provinces, piaohao were only active and had a foothold in 
Hankou and Shanghai. The reason why they had the ability to carve niches was 
because these two places were the prominent trade and financial center. Shanghai was 
also the final submission destination for the foreign loan repayment by respective 
provinces, thus piaohao would not encounter much difficulty to seek floating funds. 
According to the report by the Japanese Consul at Hankou in 1906, it revealed that 
there were over twenty Shanxi piaohao which established branches there. They 
attended the daily convention held by big local qianzhuang to negotiate the exchange 
rates between various currencies and the remittance commissions for that day.140 
Moreover, according to a statistic published in Shenbao on 24 October 1883, Shanxi 
piaohao made an over one million silver taels loan to Shanghai qianzhuang before the 
1883 financial crisis.141 
Piaohao’s financial influences in other southern provinces were rather limited 
and they had to rely on local qianzhuang to maintain their businesses. Since the local 
branch staffs of piaohao were all recruited from Shanxi province through kinship ties, 
those staffs could not communicate well with the locals due to dialects differences. In 
the meantime, piaohao never attached importance to promote their figures in the local 
market place nor as what other itinerary merchants did.142 Without such efforts to 
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deliberately penetrate into the local market, the business of piaohao was inevitably 
circumscribed. Specifically, the piaohao branches settled in Shantou, Guangdong 
province were disregarded by the locals due to the barriers of dialect and customs 
between south and north.143 According to a report by Shenbao on 6 July 1888, only 
three piaohao set up branches in Xiamen, Fujian province.144 A 1909 report by the 
Fuzhou branch of the Great Qing Bank revealed that at that point in time, only two 
remittance firms were still in operation, which were Yuanfengrun (not Shanxi piaohao 
but remittance firm owned by Jiangsu merchant) and Xintaihou piaohao. Their annual 
profits were rather tiny, whereas the businesses of twenty local qianzhuang were in 
pretty good shape.145 
Because of their inability to gain a foothold in the local financial market, 
piaohao were not always the patrons for the local qianzhuang particularly in the 
southern provinces. Instead, they often relied on the capitals from local qianzhuang as 
their floating capitals. In a depressing letter written by the Rishengchang piaohao’s 
Xiangtan branch at Hunan province, it reported to their head office that their recent 
business had been shrinking since the 1890s. This was because it became more 
difficult for them to gain floating funds from local qianzhuang after several of them 
closed in the previous years, which caused silver strains in the local financial 
market.146  
In sum, it was not necessary for piaohao to carve out their unique business 
niches wherever their branches were set up. While this might still be true in northern 
China, piaohao’s operations in the local financial market in the southern China relied 
on the financial support from local qianzhuang. Thus, the influences of local 
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qianzhuang in the south were more significant than piaohao. 
Foreign banks 
Although the main purpose of the foreign banks in China was to provide financial 
services to foreign firms conducting trades in China, and thus did not initially 
concentrate in conducting inter-provincial remittances, they also competed with the 
piaohao in conducting official remittance business. Their advantages in the remittance 
businesses lay in the fact that they could gain abundant capital supports from their 
head offices and merchants of their native countries. More importantly, by issuing 
banknotes, they could mobilize their paid-up capitals manifold and thus did not have 
to worry about the floating funds for remittances as the Shanxi piaohao did.  
In 1900, the Boxer Rebellion disturbed the local financial markets in northern 
China. Thus, most of the piaohao temporarily closed down to evade the possible 
attacks and plunders. The submission pattern of the Capital Requisition to the central 
government was modified. It was divided into two steps. The first was to remit the 
payments through some piaohao which insisted on operation, and the other remittance 
firms to the Shanghai Maritime Customs. Following that, the HSBC’s Shanghai 
branch would remit the money to the central government in Beijing on behalf of the 
Shanghai Maritime Customs. 147  This means piaohao were no longer the last 
consignees of the governmental remittance since 1900, which made their influences 
diminished. 
Besides the remittance business, the local people gradually resorted to foreign 
banks instead of local qianzhuang and piaohao to deposit money. In a Shenbao 
editorial published on 26 July 1896, it points out that common Chinese people had 
preferred to deposit money into HSBC since it would not go bankrupt easily and thus 
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was more reliable than the local qianzhuang. As both qianzhuang and piaohao had to 
keep a good contact with HSBC to gain floating funds, the latter’s money reserve 
certainly was far more abundant than the former.148 Furthermore, in the southern 
coastal areas of China where the piaohao’s influences were frail, foreign banks 
penetrated into those local financial markets successfully. In an investigation 
published by Dagongbao on 8 March 1908, it revealed that the HSBC and the Bank of 
Taiwan were the most prominent figures in the local financial market of Xiamen, 
Fujian province.149 HSBC also worked in conjunction with the Great Qing Bank to 
pacify the panics in the Chinese financial market in Shanghai in 1900. 150 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the previous indigenous distance commodity trades for which piaohao 
mainly provided remittance services declined gradually after the 1850s; piaohao then 
had to find new lucrative remittance businesses to earn profits. It was the Taiping 
Rebellions that provided piaohao a golden opportunity, which they fortunately seized 
it. However, although from then on, piaohao conducted a considerable amount of the 
official remittance and their business prospered indeed, other financial figures also 
competed for such business. In addition, piaohao’s influences on the local Chinese 
financial market were limited and ambiguous as compared to the qianzhuang and 
foreign banks.  
In fact, piaohao’s final decline in 1910s was latent and inevitable since they 
never carved out their unique niches in the Chinese financial market from the very 
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beginning. After the 1900s, the Qing government gradually took back the previous 
remittance services conducted by the piaohao in order to centralize their own 
financial sectors. By doing so, they gradually discarded the piaohao. This was a final 
blow to piaohao’s survival. The following chapter will focus on the financial 
transitions of the Qing government after 1895 and illustrate how and why piaohao did 
not response to such transitions.  
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Chapter 4: Piaohao and the Financial Transformations of Qing after 1895 
This chapter first analyzes the financial transformations of Qing after 1895 and the 
resultant effects on the future survival of piaohao. Specifically, the establishment of 
modern Chinese banks eclipsed the significance of piaohao not only in the official 
remittance market but also in the entire Chinese financial market. It further explains 
the reasons why piaohao did not want to seize the chance during that period and were 
impassive to the new policies from the government. The fundamental reason is the 
frightened sentiment taken shape by responding to the constant financial appeals from 
the Qing government after 1850s which prevented piaohao’s further collaborations 
with it. Finally, some of the progressive branch managers of piaohao had proposed to 
consolidate them into a modern Chinese bank. However, it failed due to the 
oppositions from the decision makers inside piaohao. Thus, piaohao lost all the 
possible chances to reform in the course of the financial transitions of the Qing since 
1895. 
 
1. The effects brought by the financial transformations of Qing after 1895 
The central government of Qing had implemented unprecedented reforms since 1895. 
This was due to a series of dynastic crises such as being defeated by Japan and the 
subsequent conclusion of Shimonoseki Treaty in 1895, the Boxer Uprising and later 
the invasion of Eight-Allied Power Army in Beijing in 1900. These events affected the 
overall psychology of the Qing which greeted for reforms desperately to save the 
collapsing dynasty. 151  In the realms of banking and finance particularly, new 
institutions established by the Qing central government with the main concern to 
centralize its financial administration inevitably influenced the future survival of 
piaohao.  
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Competitions in Remittance business with modern Chinese banks after 1897 
Before the establishment of the first modern Chinese bank—the Imperial Bank of 
China in 1897, the central court of Qing did not realize the importance of a modern 
bank. In 1885, when Li Hongzhang proposed to establish a foreign-Chinese joint-bank, 
the Board of Revenue turned down the proposal, arguing that such a joint bank was 
only the intrigue of the foreign countries to control the finance in China. It further 
argued that nobody would benefit from such a bank except the bank itself, and it 
would drain the financial rights out of the central court as well.152  
However, a year later after the establishment of the Imperial Bank of China, a 
memorandum issued by the Board of Revenue evidenced the eventual transformation 
of the government’s perceptions of a modern bank. It alleged that a modern bank was 
not to monopolize the financial rights of a country. Instead, it would provide both 
visible and invisible benefits to the country. For the visible part, the greater the profits 
of the bank, the more it contributed to the central government. As for the invisible one, 
a bank would facilitate a country’s the trade and commerce to run smoothly. It further 
contended that a bank would redistribute the merchants’ profits to be circulated across 
a greater sphere, which would certainly benefit more people.153 
After the central court realized the importance of modern banks, it subsequently 
supported the banks’ development. In 1898, Sheng Xuanhuai, the founder of the 
Imperial Bank of China submitted a memorial proposing that the bank should be 
given the first priority to handle every remittance transaction of various provincial 
governments in order to promote the trust and reputation of this semi-official modern 
bank and to better compete with foreign banks. The request was soon approved by the 
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Board of Revenue.154 From then on, Imperial Bank of China competed with the 
piaohao for official remittance. 
    In 1904, the Board of Revenue promulgated the Tentative Prospectus of the   
Bank (shiban yinhang zhangcheng) to set up the Bank of the Board of Revenue (hubu 
yinhang). It was defined as a limited liability company and followed the principles of 
the western banks. 155  In February 1908, after the Board of Revenue (hubu) 
reorganized into the Ministry of Finance (duzhibu), the Bank of the Board of Revenue 
was upgraded into the Great Qing Bank and was defined as the central bank of 
China.156 From then on, the branches of the Great Qing Bank in various provinces 
were being assigned as the sole financial agencies of the central government and were 
given priority to deal with provincial remittances.157 
The immediate dominance of the newly established modern Chinese banks 
seized the lion’s share in the official remittance market. This was immediately 
reflected in the correspondences by various piaohao. Weifenghou piaohao’s Chengdu 
branch in 1908 complained that after the Great Qing Bank set up the branch there, it 
handled half the amount of the provincial remittance. As a result, thirteen piaohao had 
to compete for the remaining half portion.158 Letters written by Li Hongling also 
confirmed the inevitable effects of the establishment of Great Qing Bank. Even 
though it had operated only for a few years and its financial functions were not 
comprehensive, it had already seized almost all the remittance businesses previously 
handled by piaohao.159 
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Apart from the establishment of modern banks, various provincial governments 
also gradually established their own provincial silver repositories (guanyinhao) after 
1896 in response to the central court’s call for financial transformations.160 The main 
business scope of those provincial repositories was to handle provincial revenues and 
provide remittance services for the provincial governments. Thus, they set up various 
branches in big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai and Hankou, and also built up 
extensive intra-provincial networks to provide remittance services among places 
within a certain province. Those provincial silver repositories further took away a 
considerable portion of provincial remittance business previously handled by piaohao. 
For example, after the Jiangxi silver repository was established in 1902, it 
monopolized all the provincial remittances by the following year.161 In Sichuan 
province, after its provincial silver repository named Junchuanyuan was established in 
1905, it handled 30 percent of the Capital Requisition of the remissions. Thus the 
remaining 70 percent had to be divided equally and conducted by six Shanxi piaohao 
and Tianshunxiang remittance firm from Yunnan.162 
Other new financial demands and functions which piaohao could not fulfill 
While piaohao gradually lost their former governmental remittance business due to 
stiff competitions from newly established modern Chinese banks, it could not meet 
the new financial demands as well. Specifically, the newly-established modern banks, 
especially the Great Qing Bank had the responsibility and the ability to pacify panics 
in the financial market generated by economic crises, which happened frequently after 
China’s integration into the volatile world market from the 1870s. Specifically, Article 
Twelve of the Rules of the Great Qing Bank (daqing yinhang zeli) articulated clearly 
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that the bank must bear the responsibility for appeasing the panics caused by the silver 
strains and to stabilize the financial market.163 However, piaohao did not possess the 
ability and had to rely on the protection from those official financial institutions as 
well, because their financial strength was not great enough to protect the whole 
financial market.  
In 1908, some dominant merchant houses in Yingkou suddenly closed down, 
causing confusion in the local economic and financial market. It was the Great Qing 
Bank’s Yingkou branch which coordinated the chaotic phases and cleared the bad 
debts left by those houses.164 In 1910, the head office of Yuanfengrun remittance firm 
in Shanghai went bankrupt due to the speculation on rubber shares, and its branches in 
Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou closed down subsequently. This caused a chain effect 
on the local financial markets where it set up branches. The Great Qing Bank thus 
immediately remitted more than 1,000,000 silver taels to Shanghai It also tried to 
maintain the stability of the local financial markets in Beijing, Tianjin and Guangzhou 
by injecting funds into them. In addition, other newly-founded neonatal modern banks 
such as the Bank of Communications (jiaotong yinhang), the Zhili Provincial Bank 
(zhili yinhang) and a private commercial modern bank named Zhicheng Bank 
(zhicheng yinhang) also joined in the rescue movement in conjunction with Great 
Qing Bank.165  
The modern Chinese banks could also finance on the constructions of 
infrastructure and modern industries whereas piaohao could not. In fact, the birth of 
modern Chinese banks was the result of China’s new financial demands from modern 
industries and infrastructures which both qianzhuang and piaohao could not meet, 
because those native financial institutions in China was so thwarted and they had 
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operated on too small a scale to make much impact on the industrial financing that 
was needed.166 However, how those modern banks supported the new industrial 
demands in China are out of the scope of thesis, thus no further examples will be 
given here.  
 
2. Why piaohao refrained from joining the financial transformations of Qing 
In fact, Qing government did consider collaborating with the piaohao in the realms of 
banking and finance during their financial transitions since 1895, but piaohao refused 
to do so. In 1896, when Sheng Xuanhuai (1844-1916) prepared to set up the Imperial 
Bank of China, he wanted to cooperate with Shanxi piaohao in terms of staff 
recruitments, remittance services and local branch constructions, but he failed to reach 
out to any of the staff of piaohao.167 When the Bank of the Board of Revenue 
prepared its establishment in 1904, the piaohao were also encouraged to subscribe to 
its shares. However, in a convention held by the preparatory committee of the Bank of 
the Board of Revenue, the deputies from almost all piaohao refused to purchase any 
shares from the upcoming bank with the excuse that they could not assume such big 
duties assigned by the Qing government.168 
At first glance, it seems that piaohao were irrational to decline the offers to 
cooperate with establishing the modern Chinese banks. They had gained considerable 
developments through serving the Qing government since 1860s, so why this time 
they gave up the chance to make more profits in the future by taking part in 
establishing modern Chinese banks with the government? However, the following 
thorough perusal of the long-term interactions between piaohao and the government 
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from the 1850s to 1911 would justify the piaohao’s behaviors as rational.  
Since the 1860s, the Qing government utilized the remittance services of the 
piaohao and allowed the latter to gain considerable profits. However, at the same time, 
the government had extracted money from piaohao through various monetary appeals 
such as compulsory levies, donations and loans. They even tried to reduce the 
remittance commissions as early as in 1850, when piaohao had not started to provide 
remittance business for the government. Qing had to meet their expanding fiscal 
demands to suppress the internal rebellions while at the same time paying off the 
increasing indemnities with the shortfalls in the land taxes which lacked the expansion 
ability after the Taiping Rebellion started in 1851. Such constant financial appeals 
from the government impacted negatively on the sentiments of piaohao towards the 
government. Eventually, they panicked whenever the government sent any financial 
request or appeal to them and a frightened sentiment had taken shape through the 
previous interactions with the government for more than forty years. As such, it 
prevented piaohao from collaborating with the Qing government during the financial 
transitions from 1895. 
Voluntary donations and irregular levies 
The Qing government had employed voluntary donations and irregular levies to raise 
funds from piaohao since the 1850s. Sometimes they combined those methods and 
shifted adroitly between the two. When one method failed, the other could be quickly 
substituted in to meet the government’s financial needs without any delay. 
In 1853, in order to justify the action to persuade piaohao merchants to donate, 
the investigating censor of Guangxi province called Zhang Siheng exaggerated in his 
memorial that according to his estimation, the Sun family in Taigu County owned 
more than twenty million taels, Cao family and Jia family owned four to five millions 
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of silver taels respectively. Hou family in Pingyao County which owned Weitaihou, 
Weishengchang, Weifenghou, Tianchengheng and Xintaihou piaohao possessed over 
3-4 million taels and so on. Consequently it would be no difficulty for those Shanxi 
merchants to donate a small portion such as ten thousand taels to support the military 
expenses to suppress the Taiping Rebellions.169 Such a memorial was probably an 
overstatement of the strengths of Shanxi piaohao merchants because the whole annual 
income of the Qing government during the late imperial time in 1875, was only 
around 80,000,000 silver taels., Hence, it was impossible for a few Shanxi merchants 
to possess half the amount of a country’s annual income.170  
The Qing government had promised to grant official titles or ranks as rewards to 
encourage more piaohao merchants to donate money. Although piaohao might be 
willing to do so to promote their political status, they usually donated around 200 to 
500 taels, which was too small for a big official title or a high rank. In fact, the titles 
they gained were usually the lowest such as “Student of the Imperial College” 
(jiansheng) or “Students who passed the County Exams”(junxiu) which was without 
any real official post. For example, the manager of Weitaihou named Mao Honghui 
donated 400 silver taels in October 1853. In return, he gained a small title named 
Assistant Gate Commandant (shouyusuo qianzong).171  
The official-title rewards for the voluntary donations gradually lost their 
attraction to Shanxi merchants. Primarily, those conferred official titles were too 
insignificant to do any real good to piaohao merchants. In addition, the government 
called for donations too frequently for various matters. Thus, Prince Yixin once 
memorialized in 1854 that the Shanxi merchants became rather slack towards the 
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donation appeals from the government.172  
Besides invoking voluntary donations from piaohao merchants to cope with the 
internal and external crisis of the country, the Qing court also resorted to irregular 
levies on the merchants, with piaohao as the biggest target. The Qing court had 
realized the benefits of the irregular commercial levies as early as in 1853, during 
which the Qing court asked piaohao to donate shop taxes (pushui) in Beijing to raise 
military expenditure for suppressing the Taiping Rebellion. Prince Hui (huiqinwang) 
named Mianyu pointed out in a memorial that collecting shop taxes was a shortcut to 
raise considerable military funds within a short period. Furthermore, it was superior to 
voluntary donations, for the latter were only applicable to the big merchants and was 
irregular, while the former could be levied on a monthly basis which its objects 
extended into more mediocre peddlers.173 
    Sometimes, if the government failed to levy taxes from the merchants to 
supplement their revenues, it would adroitly shift to voluntary donations immediately. 
In September 1884, the Board of Revenue asked merchants and firms, especially 
every branch of piaohao to submit 600 silver taels annually as the registration fee in 
government. The piaohao merchants were asked to submit the stipulated amount 
before they could continue with their remittance businesses. Although such 
registration concern had something to do with regulating and supervising the financial 
market after the bankruptcy of the Fukang remittance firms by Hu Guangyong in 1883, 
as the ordinance had alleged, such registration was in fact a regular commercial tax 
levied for the military expenses need for the Sino-French War.174 
After such ordinance was announced, almost all branches of piaohao such as 
those in Sichuan, Gansu, Zhili, Shanxi, Guangxi, Jiangsu, and Fujian, and so on 
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opposed it, with the excuse that their recent businesses were not in good condition due 
to the natural disasters in Shanxi province during the previous years. Instead, they 
would rather prefer a voluntary donation, and requested the government to endorse 
their Beijing branches as deputies to submit the allocated quota once and for all.175 
Thus, in 1885, Wang Jian, the Investigating Censor of Jiangxi province, memorialized 
to the court that such registration requirements should be altered into a combination of 
voluntary and compulsory donations again and any refusal to it was not allowed at all. 
He then conceded that official titles would be rewarded based on the exact donation 
amounts. Wang’s proposal was immediately endorsed and enforced by the central 
government. 176  Thus, registration appeal of the government during 1880s was 
actually a camouflage for its financial request. 
Loans to the government 
Piaohao were also obliged to loan money to the government, which were never 
guaranteed that such loans would be returned later. Specifically, as revenue demands 
from the central governments increased constantly, the respective provincial customs 
encountered more difficulties to submit their quotas duly. Thus, they had to resort to 
borrow money from piaohao and other remittance firms to fulfill the duties assigned 
from the central government. A memorial of the Board of Revenue in 1895 revealed 
that from 1885 to 1894, various provincial Customs had owed the Capital 
Requisitions, the army supplies for defending the Capital, and military provisions for 
defending the borders up to 4,710,000 silver taels. It then asked the customs to submit 
their allocated quotas as soon as possible and should not procrastinate in paying the 
due amount in the future.177  
In order to submit the required revenues to the central government on time, 
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Maritime Customs of the various provinces, especially those in Guangzhou, Fujian 
and Zhejiang, borrowed money from piaohao and other remittance firms such as 
Fukang in order to submit their stipulated quotas to the Beijing duly from 1862 to the 
demise of Qing in 1911.178 By the same token, provincial governments also had to 
loan from Shanxi piaohao and other remittance firms to submit their allocated quotas 
to Beijing. For example, in 1877, the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General Liu 
Kunyi borrowed from Zhichengxin, Xiechengqian, Qianjisheng, Yuanfengjiu 
piaohao’s branches in Guangdong totally up to 160,000 silver taels as the forth batch 
of the provincial tax quota to Beijing.179 In 1903, Sichuan province already owed the 
branches of Shanxi piaohao over 300,000 silver taels, while they continued to borrow 
another 180,000 silver taels to submit their assigned portion of war indemnity to 
Beijing.180 
Since 1860s until the demise of Qing in 1911, the problem of such loans from 
piaohao is that they were usually never repaid. Although they were promised to be 
repaid by those provinces’ future revenues such as lijin taxes, customs revenues, land 
taxes and other miscellaneous taxes, the most frequent result was that whenever those 
taxes were collected, which were formerly stipulated to repay piaohao, the priority 
was then given to meet new financial appeals such as the new assignment of Capital 
Requisition or the provincial army needs. An editorial in the China and Foreign 
Countries Daily (Zhongwai ribao) published on 13 October 1903, commented that 
although the imperial government sometimes had repaid the loans to piaohao, they 
would borrow from piaohao shortly after whenever their silver storage was in a 
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shortfall.181 In another statistic by Dagongbao published on 14 December 1911, it 
also revealed that the total amount of money that Qing government borrowed from 
Shanxi piaohao was about 7,000,000 silver taels, and had not yet been returned.182  
Since the loans to the government could be not repaid as promised, piaohao were 
usually reluctant and tried to evade the loans to the respective provincial governments. 
In 1878, Liu Kunyi asked piaohao and other Shanxi merchants to loan money as the 
relief fund for a famine in Shaanxi. However, they all refused to do so with the excuse 
that they encountered severe silver shortage. Few months later, these merchants 
finally agreed to lend money after the Shaanxi government agreed to pay piaohao 
with higher interest rates.183 A letter dated around 1900 by the Wuhan branch of 
Rishengchang piaohao also reflected their reluctance to make loans. It explained to its 
Pingyao head office that they had no other choice but to lend 8,000 silver taels to the 
provincial army, because they were forced them to do so without any leeway.184  
Nonetheless, piaohao sometimes had to make loans to government officials in 
order to maintain good personal contacts with them to facilitate their further official 
businesses. Actually, this was only a means of political capital cultivation. They were 
reluctant to lend money to them but without much choice. This is a convincing 
reflection that the relationship between piaohao and government was frail and 
tentative. Between the year 1851 and 1852, letters from Weitaihou piaohao’s Suzhou 
branch complained that since they had offended Ni, the Grain Intendant (liangdao) of 
Suzhou, thus they failed to obtain the chance to remit the official Expenditures of 
Grain Shipment via Sea (haiyun jingfei) though they had made every effort to appease 
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Ni’s anger and asking for help from other local officials.185 
In order to avoid offending the officials, piaohao had to cultivate good 
relationships with the Qing officials as carefully as possible. This means that they had 
to try their best to meet the personal finance needs of the officials. For example, 
Zhang Linge, an official dispatched from Beijing to Sichuan borrowed 2,000 silver 
taels from Weifenghou piaohao’s Beijing branch. Li Hongling, the piaohao manager, 
reminded his Sichuan branch not press for his debt immediately, for this official might 
be promoted to a higher post in the future. As a result, the officials did not force the 
piaohao to make loans; Piaohao were doing it to a degree voluntarily as a way of 
forming patron-client networks.186 Other officials such as Zhao Erxun and Sheng Jifu 
had once borrowed between 2,000 and 3,000 silver taels from Weifenghou as well, 
while Li Hongling also commented that their outstanding loans should not be pressed 
for. This was because Zhao Erxun once had helped them to clear the defaulted loans 
during his tenure in Hunan province and their branch in Shaanxi further needed the 
patronage of Sheng Jifu, who was then the Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu 
from 1905 to 1908.187 
Reductions on remittance commission 
In addition to voluntary donations, irregular levies, and loans, the Qing government 
was even unwilling to pay piaohao their deserved remittance commissions and even 
continuously asked to reduce them, especially after 1900. Since then, the remittance 
commission fee from Sichuan province to Beijing was reduced from 150 taels to 130 
taels per silver taels for every 10,000 remitted.188 The fee for remitting money from 
Anhui province to Beijing was reduced from 140 taels to 100 taels per 10,000 silver 
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taels.189 Following the reduction ordinances of the Board of Revenue, other provinces, 
such as Shaanxi, Guangxi, Zhejiang, also reduced the commissions paid to piaohao.190 
Invisible sufferance 
Piaohao also invisibly suffered from providing official businesses to the government 
in which they viewed them as burdens. A letter from Xietongqing piaohao’s Hankou 
branch complained that they were forced to conduct 30,000 silver taels as the Guansu 
army’s payments. Yet, their Lanzhou branch in Gansu had already been depleted when 
they previously submitted another 40,000 silver taels. Therefore, it was then difficult 
for them to find floating funds to accomplish this bill of remittance. However, they 
still had to remit such amount without any leeway by sustaining losses at their own 
expenses.191 
     Furthermore, when piaohao submitted their stipulated remitted silvers to the 
official treasury, they were always suffered due to the extractions from the silver 
warehouse officers with the deliberate excuses that their silver finesses did not meet 
the official treasury standard. A staff named Hou Zhongzhu, who once worked in the 
Xietongqing piaohao’s Fuzhou and Lanzhou branches, also revealed in an 1889 letter 
to his parents that piaohao had to suffer a dual extortion for official remittances. 
Besides the extortions from the Capital silver repository officers in Beijing, they also 
had to pay a certain amount of silver taels known as the “Expenses for Paper and 
Brush Pen” (zhibifei) as tribute to the Fujian Maritime Customs or the Fujian 
provincial treasury (fanku). Consequently, he advised that some of the official 
remittances, such as remitting salt taxes from Fujian to Beijing, should not be 
conducted at all, because its costs had exceeded the commission they would gain.192 
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Piaohao’s frightened sentiment to Qing government 
The long-term alienated relations between piaohao and the government would be 
evidenced from piaohao’s rejection to register in the Ministry of Finance in 1908. On 
16 January 1908, the Ministry of Finance promulgated the Universal Rules for Banks 
(yinghang tongxing zeli) in order to unify, supervise and manage the Chinese financial 
market. It thus required all native financial institutions such as qianzhuang and 
piaohao to register in the ministry as ordinary banks (putong yinhang) within three 
years. If they had not registered by then, they would no longer be allowed to conduct 
remittance business. Moreover, the rules also articulated that the Ministry of Finance 
reserved the rights to regularly inspect the financial condition and currency reserves 
of those ordinary banks.193  
After such rules were announced, all piaohao felt panic. Even Li Hongling, the 
most progressive Beijing branch manager of Weifenghou piaohao, opposed it and 
worried that such registration would be detrimental to the interests of piaohao. He 
thus presented a petition that those piaohao which opened before 1900 should be 
exempted for such registration via the Beijing General Chamber of Commerce 
(jingshi shangwu zonghui), in order to retain the interests of piaohao and not to spill it 
out (libu waiyi).194 However, the Ministry of Finance turned down Li’s requests and 
decidedly enforced the registration. Thus, all Shanxi piaohao and other remittance 
firms owned by non-Shanxi merchant such as Tianshunxiang paid the registration fees 
on behalf of all their branches in Beijing on 25 December 1909. The total number 
including all the branches of piaohao registered was 358, with only four silver taels 
for each branch.195  
Compared with the previous 600 taels registration fee of each branch required by 
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the government in 1884, such symbolic petty registration fee, which was four taels for 
each branch, was a convincing proof that the purpose of registration appeal by the 
Qing court this time was not to extract money from piaohao but to centralize the 
financial administration, and to regulate the financial market after its financial 
transformations began in 1895. However, piaohao could not understand such 
underlying purpose. This could probably be attributed to their previous interactions 
with the government. Because they were extracted so frequently since the 1850s, such 
registration would likely to be perceived as just the extortion from the Qing court.  
In sum, although piaohao seized the official remittance chances to make profits 
and reinforced their roles in Chinese financial market, their interactions with Qing 
government since the 1850s were still far from pleasant. Extorted by the government 
through various donations, levies, loans and other invisible extractions, piaohao 
eventually formed a highly suspicious attitude towards any policy from the Qing 
government, as they would assume that the ultimate purpose of the government was to 
squeeze money from them. Consequently, piaohao would rather prefer to run their 
business independently whenever possible. This could now further analyze why 
piaohao could not realize the great financial transitions of Qing and seized chances 
from it during the 1900s. Instead, they even hesitated to enforce the registration 
policies in 1908. After forty years of unpleasant interactions with the Qing 
government, piaohao could not suddenly remedy their horrified sentiments toward the 
policies from the Qing government. 
 
3. The abortive piaohao reform into a modern bank in 1908-09 
After the modern Chinese banks were established after 1897, piaohao’s remittance 
business for the provincial governments dramatically declined. This was especially so 
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after the Bank of the Board of Revenue was founded in 1905, which aimed at 
administering the financial matters for the central Qing government. Piaohao were 
suddenly under the pressure of their existence in the Chinese financial market, 
especially those branch managers in the big cities who had witnessed the financial 
transitions of Qing and perceived the overwhelming financial power of the new 
modern Chinese banks. They thus wanted to consolidate all piaohao into a united 
modern bank and retain the status of piaohao in the financial market. 
The most representative branch manager who called for the consolidation of 
piaohao was Li Hongling. Since the 1870s, he served in Weifenghou’s Shanghai, 
Wuhan and Beijing branches over thirty years.196 His experience from sojourning in 
those major cities in China gave him the rare opportunity to contact with the 
unprecedented changes taken place in China. In 1904, Li noted in his letter to the 
Weifenghou’s head office in Pingyao that the competitions of the financial market 
were intensified. Specifically, ten years ago, clients would seek piaohao for services 
voluntarily even if they raised their commission. With the increased competition from 
other piaohao and modern banks, nobody would come to piaohao if they did not 
advertise businesses. Thus, he warned that a reform inside piaohao was imperative 
and the head offices in Pingyao should not adhere to the old business customs.197 
On 23 March 1908, Li Hongling eventually asked for some supports from other 
piaohao’s branches in Beijing to write to piaohao’s head offices in Shanxi province so 
as to endorse a reform to consolidate them into a Shanxi Remittance Bank (jinsheng 
huiye yinhang). Specifically, he proposed that each piaohao could contribute a 
funding capital from 30,000 to 50,000 silver taels, and the upcoming bank should be 
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organized under limited liability.198  
However, Li’s proposal did not receive any response from the Pingyao head 
office. Such innovative reformation was intensively opposed by Mao Yunsheng, the 
proprietor of Weifenghou piaohao, who also had the overwhelming influences on the 
decision making processes in Weitaihou, Tianchengheng, Xintaihou and 
Weishengchang piaohao. He even calumniated Li Hongling that his purpose of doing 
so was only to generate more money for himself.199 Consequently, such reform was 
thus aborted in 1909, and piaohao lost its final stake in a modernized Chinese 
financial market. 
As to the reasons for why the proprietors of piaohao’s Pingyao head offices 
rejected such reform proposal, no more were disclosed in Li Hongling’s own accounts 
other than the reason of Mao’s distrust of him. Yet besides his recordings, no other 
sources were available on the responses of the proprietors to the 1908 reforms. Thus, 
this thesis can only make a speculation on the reason why those proprietors opposed 
such reforms. The probable reason that why the decision makers of piaohao declined 
the branch manager’s reform proposals might be due to the fact that they had never 
stepped out of their residential counties in Shanxi province. Therefore, unlike the 
branch managers, they could not perceive the competition pressures brought about by 
the financial transitions of the Qing government. As compared with the branch 
mangers of piaohao, those proprietors were more inward-looking and inclined to keep 
the old business conventions, and they in fact lacked the accesses to the rapid 
changing society. In fact, Li Hongling had long perceived the inward-looking nature 
of the proprietors in the head office. As early as in 1907, he wrote several letters to 
persuade the proprietors of piaohao to tour around the major cities such as Beijing, 
                                                        
198 Ibid., 185-7. 
199 Ibid., 157, 178. 
 76
Tianjin, Shanghai and Hankou, which would allow them to directly encounter the 
great transformations in these cities. He further contended that only after such direct 
and personal experiences could the proprietors have the ability to control and develop 
the businesses of piaohao in the future under the rapid changing circumstances.200 
However, his proposals were also not accepted by the head office in Pingyao.  
 
4. Conclusion 
In sum, after the Taiping Rebellion in the 1860s, Qing government utilized the 
remittance services by piaohao without providing any protections for them. Instead, in 
order to meet their revenue demands, it began to extract money from the piaohao 
through various methods, such as encouraging piaohao to donate voluntarily. If such 
method failed, Qing government would impose irregular levies to piaohao. Besides, 
both the central and provincial government also borrowed money from piaohao. In 
fact, most of the time, such loans were not repaid to piaohao. The government also 
tried to reduce the remittance commissions of piaohao for the sake of budget 
constraints. Shanxi piaohao thus developed a petrified sentiment towards the Qing 
government. In fact, piaohao did pay heavily for their business expansion after 1860s.  
After 1895, the Qing government implemented unprecedented reforms in the 
realms of banking and finance. The most prominent one was to endorse the 
establishments of modern Chinese banks in 1897. From then on, piaohao’s previous 
remittance businesses for the provincial bureaucracies were gradually seized by them. 
However, during the course of the preparations of the modern Chinese banks, piaohao 
were indeed invited to take part, but they declined such offer. The reason could be 
attributed to their previous unpleasant interactions with the government since the 
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1860s. As they were worried that those invitations were just another method to extract 
money from them, they did not want to get involved with the new financial 
institutions. Thus, piaohao lost the opportunity to catch up with the new financial 
trends in China after 1895.  
Under the pressures brought about by the modern Chinese banks in the financial 
market, some foresighted branch managers of piaohao proposed that all piaohao 
should be consolidated into a united modern bank in 1908. However, such reform was 
aborted due to the oppositions of piaohao’s decision makers. Shanxi piaohao 
eventually lost the last possible opportunity to revive the Chinese financial market.  
 
Chapters Three and Four analyze the reasons for piaohao’s decline through the 
perspective of piaohao’s relations with the Qing government. The two chapters 
demonstrate that providing remittance businesses for the Qing government was a 
two-edge sword. While piaohao did gain considerable development in their business 
since the 1860s, they also paid prices for that. As a result, when the financial 
transformations of the Qing began in 1895, piaohao refrained from joining them, thus 
hindered their survival in the Chinese financial market. However, those factors were 
still not the decisive ones to determine the fate of piaohao. If piaohao had nurtured 
better business styles, this would have helped them to carve out their unique niches 
either in the remittance market or other financial sectors such as the role played by 
some big qianzhuang in supporting cash crop trades in Shanghai. The following 
chapter will reveal that unfortunately, piaohao neither possess nor attempt to nurture 
better business styles, which hindered their remittance operations, and in fact were the 
fundamental reasons for their final decline. 
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Chapter 5: Piaohao’s Innate Operational Defects 
This chapter will focus on piaohao’s business operations to illustrate the fundamental 
reasons for the decline of piaohao. It suggests that such decline could be ascribed to 
their innately defective business styles. Specifically, piaohao’s initial founding 
capitals were insufficient as compared with those modern Chinese banks based on the 
western banking principles. Piaohao never attached importance to absorb money from 
the deposits of individual accounts, which made the floating funds of piaohao more 
limited, especially after the Qing government deprived piaohao of their rights to 
handle official repositories since 1895. Furthermore, the proprietors of piaohao 
usually opened more than one piaohao and other mercantile firms, which greatly 
scattered the capitals of each piaohao. To make matter worse, piaohao never formed a 
coherent financial community either inside or outside their residential localities. This 
further blocked their available internal financial sources. All these were of hindrance 
to piaohao’s remittance business, which intensively demanded floating funds. Last but 
not least, their defective bookkeeping methods and the trend of currency unification 
after the 1900s were also damaging to piaohao’s survival in the Chinese financial 
market. 
 
1. Limited working funds of piaohao 
After the modern Chinese banks established and began to deal with remittances for 
the Qing government, piaohao lost their remittance businesses from the provincial 
governments and quickly declined. One reason for such decline was due to the fact 
that they could not enjoy the preferential treatments from the Qing government as the 
modern Chinese banks could. However, the most fundamental reason was due to 
piaohao’s limited working funds for remittance transactions as compared to those of 
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the modern banks. Without abundant floating funds, piaohao sometimes could not 
handle the remittance bills of large amounts, which hindered their business expansion.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, piaohao’s remittance business needed abundant 
floating capitals to smoothly keep the transfer of funds. Their funding capitals were 
definitely one of the most important sources. However, piaohao’s founding capitals 
were rather limited. Each piaohao was initially capitalized from 100,000 to 300,000 
silver taels. As a result, each branch would not gain more than 10,000 silver taels as 
its working capital, unless those primary branches in Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, 
which sometimes had the chance to get 30,000 taels.201 On the contrary, when the 
Imperial Bank of China was established in 1897, it gained a paid-up capital of 2.5 
million taels and one million silver taels of loan from the Board of Revenue.202 The 
founding capital of the Board of Revenue was four million silver taels, and later 
expanded into ten million taels in 1908, after it was upgraded to form the Great Qing 
Bank.203 The working funds for each branch of the Great Qing Bank would vary from 
100,000 to 200,000 silver taels.204 Such stark contrasts of the founding capitals 
illustrate clearly the different capital strengths of piaohao and modern banks. 
Funds from qianzhuang and those deposited for future remittance by merchants 
who dealt with interregional wholesale trades were also important sources for the 
floating capitals of piaohao. However, as discussed in Chapter Three, piaohao could 
not effectively absorb funds from qianzhuang, especially in those branches that were 
set up in the southern provinces of China due to the barriers of local customs. 
Furthermore, as the interregional trades conducted by Chinese merchants declined 
since the 1860s, the available funds from those merchants became less approachable. 
                                                        
201 SPS, 326, 581-2; also refer to Table 1. 
202 Zhongguo tongshang yinhang ed., Wushi nianlai zhi zhongguo Jingji, 3. 
203 Daqing yinhang qinglichu [The Great Qing Bank Clearance office] ed., Daqing yinhang shimoji, 3, 9. 
204 Ibid., 38-39. 
 80
Thus, from then on, piaohao mainly relied on the money from various provincial 
treasuries and repositories as their working capitals for remittances. 
Piaohao’s over-reliance on the provincial funds rendered their neglect on another 
important source of floating funds for remittance—deposits from the common people. 
Piaohao usually did not accept public deposits unless the depositors had particular 
importance to the development of piaohao. Before 1895, such neglect did not affect 
their regular business negatively because piaohao could utilize various provincial 
funds as their working capitals for the remittance transactions. However, after the 
Qing government began to centralize their financial sectors in 1895, piaohao lost their 
previous rights to access to provincial funds, and this accelerated their final decline.  
The neglect on popular deposits and primarily focus on official funds of Shanxi 
piaohao could be verified through two sources. The first source is taken from the 
regulations drafted by piaohao themselves. Specifically, in a 1901 regulation written 
by Dadetong piaohao’s head office at Pingyao County, for the settlement of its new 
branch in Chengdu indicated that this new branch would mainly focus on the 
remittance businesses from the Sichuan provincial government and the management 
of Provincial Treasury. As to the issue on regular deposits, if the customers had asked 
for a lower interest, they would still consider to utilize part of it. However, if they 
asked for an interest rate higher than 4.8% per year, such deposits would not be 
accepted unless the customer was of a particular importance to them. They further 
commented that since their business scale was already big enough, there was no need 
to absorb deposits for they would load their business with unnecessary interest 
payments.205  
The second source is based on the observations by foreigners, who were either 
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the staffs of Maritimes Customs or diplomatic Consuls fulfilling their duties in China. 
The Decennial Reports between 1882 and 1891 by the Shanghai Maritimes Customs 
also confirmed that half of the sixteen Shanxi piaohao operated in Chongqing were 
semi-official financial institutions which were endorsed the rights to manage and 
remit the funds for Capital Requisition on behalf of the provincial government. They 
did not attach great importance to absorb public deposits.206 The report made by 
Japanese deputy Consul in Shashi, Hubei province, revealed in 1906 that the eleven 
piaohao there rarely dealt with deposits from the common people, and would not even 
consider to accept it if the amount did not reach up to 1,000 silver taels.207 Other 
consuls of Japanese Consulates, such as in Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and Hankou during 
the 1900s all indicated that the branches of Shanxi piaohao there mainly dealt with 
official remittances and funds, and seldom contacted and supported the local 
merchants without the intermediaries of local qianzhuang.208 In Beijing, a Japanese 
researcher on Chinese economy also pointed out that in 1907, the major business of 
piaohao was dealing with official funds, and they generally did not received deposits 
from ordinary people.209 
Piaohao eventually realized the problems brought about by their neglect on 
public deposit. A letter written by Weifenghou piaohao’s Yingkou (in today’s 
Liaoning province) branch in 1908 bitterly revealed that after the various Provincial 
Banks and branch of the Great Qing Bank were established, their previous official 
remittance businesses dramatically decreased. While their available floating funds 
from the government were reduced, they could not effectively absorb the deposits 
from the public as well, as they could not afford the interest rate that was higher than 
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0.4% per month. On the contrary, modern banks could offer a much higher interest 
rate and allowed the depositors to withdraw their money liberally.210 
In sum, the accessible official funds from the various provincial bureaucracies 
before the financial centralization process of Qing retarded piaohao’s ability to duly 
alter their perceptions on the importance of the deposits from ordinary people. As 
such, defective business perception eventually caused the decline of piaohao soon 
after the process of the financial reforms of the Qing government began.  
 
2. Scattered capital structures 
Besides the innately limited founding and working capitals of piaohao, the scattered 
capital structures of piaohao further prevented them from accumulating sufficient 
funds to be utilized in the remittance business. This means that the proprietors of 
Shanxi piaohao usually invested money to open more than one piaohao, thus making 
each piaohao unable to effectively gain sufficient capitals. Moreover, piaohao 
proprietor would also at the same time invest in other mercantile firms dealing with 
tea, tobacco, silk or cloth. They even hoarded the silver and spent lavishly on land and 
so on. In all, the investors’ money could not be concentrated on one piaohao but 
rather loosely spread to various businesses or just simply hoard them. This further 
circumscribed the available floating funds for every piaohao and thus prevented their 
business expansion. 
There are several examples of piaohao’s proprietors scattering their investment. 
This first example is the Rishengchang piaohao. Its proprietor was Li Daquan. 
Besides Rishengchang, he also established the Qianjisheng piaohao. Furthermore, the 
Li family also operated many cash shops, grocery stores and cloth shops in Pingyao, 
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and a dyestuff firm in Tianjin.211 Another case is the Hou family. The investor Hou 
Chongji opened five piaohao simultaneously in 1826, namely the Weitaihou, 
Weifenghou, Weishengchang, Xintaihou, and Tianchengheng.212 The Hou family also 
owned several cash shops, pawnshops, dye houses, grocery shops, grain shops, and 
medicine shops both in the Shanxi province and in Beijing.213 The third example is 
the Qiao family in Qi County, which invested solely on Dadetong and Dadeheng 
piaohao. However, those two piaohao only took a very limited portion compared with 
the total number of firms owned and operated by Qiao family. In fact, the rise of the 
Qiao family was attributed to its tea trades among southern provinces of China with 
Russia and Mongolia. The initiation of their two piaohao was to cater to the financial 
needs of their tea trades.214 Consequently, the main profits of the Qiao family did not 
come from their piaohao, but from the family’s other firms such as tea, grain, money 
and pawn shops.215  
In addition, those piaohao investors hoarded silvers instead of investing more 
money on piaohao’s operation, and spent lavishly on land investment. The Qu family 
who invested in the Sanjinyuan, Changshengchuan and Baichuantong piaohao 
concurrently built two vaults in Qi County in order to keep their silver sycees. The 
total amount that they hoarded was up to 3,000,000 silver taels.216 The Chang family 
who owned the Dadeyu piaohao, invested over ten-hectare land in Yuci County, 
regardless of whether if the land quality there was inferior.217 They also built 
spectacular houses in their residential villages. For example, the Ji family which 
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owned the Qianshengheng and Qidechang piaohao spent 300,000 silver taels to build 
their house.218 It is ironic that what they would capitalize from each of their piaohao 
was only around 200,000 silver taels.219 
 
3. Weak internal and external networks of Shanxi piaohao 
The above arguments show that the remittance business scale of every piaohao is 
limited due to their insufficient working capitals used for remittance transactions. 
However, since they came from the same native localities, if each piaohao would 
support each other in terms of floating funds, which were highly valued by the 
Chinese merchants, piaohao’s total strength in the Chinese remittance market would 
be reinforced.220 However, the existing archives show that the networks of piaohao, 
either inside or outside their residential counties, were rather weak. This demonstrates 
that the thirty Shanxi piaohao never formed a cohesive financial community. Without 
financial supports from their counterparts, piaohao’s remittance business would 
encounter more difficulties as they continue to develop and expand. 
However, it is not to say that thirty Shanxi piaohao never had contact with one 
other. By and large, their internal contacts included three aspects. First, according to 
the letters of Rishengchang piaohao, several piaohao usually transferred a batch of 
real silver either from or to their residential counties collectively.221 For example, 
during the 1880s, several piaohao from the Qi County transferred silver sycees of 
about 250,000 silver taels from Hankou to their head offices in Shanxi province.222 
The purpose of doing so was probably due to the need to lower the transaction costs 
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of silver transportation between places and also to guarantee the security, since they 
could hire more armed guards to escort their money transfer carts. 
Second, most piaohao always asked the runners of other piaohao to help with the 
delivery of their correspondences and other sundries from one place to another. For 
example, the numerous letters left behind by the Rishengchang piaohao show that 
seven other piaohao had once helped with its letter delivery.223 Moreover, there was 
an occasion which the Weitaihou’s Suzhou branch had asked Rishengchang piaohao 
to help them to bring a pair of glass frame to someone in Beijing.224 However, none 
of the letter by piaohao had ever referred to matters like inter-piaohao financial 
assistances. 
Third, the piaohao would collectively defend against the government’s frequent 
request for money. Particularly, piaohao with the same origins such as Pingyao, Qi or 
Taigu County might convene on the issues of the compulsory donations from the 
government. However, those piaohao would only unite temporarily and dissolve soon 
after they submitted their donations. The motivation of doing so was merely to benefit 
their individual businesses. This was because if every piaohao donated unequally, 
government would harass both the one who contribute the highest amount and the 
lowest amount. In 1900, the provincial army in Hankou wanted to loan money from 
piaohao’s branches. Thus, all piaohao originated from Pingyao County discussed with 
each other on the actual amount that each firm should donate. They eventually agreed 
that each branch would loan 8,000 silver taels to the provincial army. However, 
Qianshengheng piaohao refused to enforce such agreement. As a result, Rishengchang 
complained that since every piaohao had its own private concerns even when dealing 
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with the public affairs inside piaohao, the common scenario was that they could never 
come to a common agreement.225. Under such circumstances, all piaohao could not 
defend themselves collectively.226  
In sum, the internal interactions among piaohao were irrelevant to the essential 
aspects of their remittance business, such as exchanging business information, setting 
interest rates and commission fees accordantly, or receiving financial assistance from 
other piaohao at a lower rate than from the outside financial sources. On the contrary, 
they only came together irregularly to defend against the government extractions 
when such cases were in extreme emergency; otherwise they were more interested in 
their own profits.  
The weak financial networks of piaohao could be further illustrated in two 
aspects: first, piaohao did not have an association inside their residential counties of 
Shanxi province to decide business affairs and collectively resolve disputes; and 
second, the local networks of piaohao outside the residential places could not provide 
supports to the itinerary piaohao merchants.227 
There were neither remaining correspondences left behind by piaohao that shows 
that they had ever formed any association inside their residential counties in Shanxi 
province nor evidence of intra-piaohao loan or deposit exist according to the 
remaining ledgers of piaohao. On the contrary, the numerous letters illustrates that 
piaohao usually charged the same commission as what they asked from other 
non-piaohao commercial firms in providing remittance services without any special 
preferential policies. Therefore, this is a convincing proof that piaohao did not have 
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close business connections with one other. For example, during the 1890s, the head 
office of Rishengchang in Pingyao remitted 6,000 silver taels for Dadeyu piaohao, 
3,000 silver taels for Cunyigong piaohao, and received a total of 100 silver taels as 
the commission from the transactions.228 During the same period, it also remitted 
5,000 taels for Dadeheng and 3,000 taels for Sanjinyuan piaohao, and another 5000 
taels for another mercantile firm, in which they gained about 300 taels as the 
remittance fee and 66 days usance.229 Moreover, according to a ledger made by 
Rishengchang’s Changsha branch for the financial year from 1896 to 1897, it 
indicated that it conducted a 15,000 taels remittance for Weifenghou piaohao to 
Hankou, and charged it 30 silver taels. 230  
Shanxi piaohao merchants did not have effective associations when doing 
business outside their residential localities. Without such local networks, it was 
difficult for them to gain overdraft privileges or loans. From a letter written by the 
Rishengchang piaohao’s Changsha branch in Hunan province during the 1890s, it 
reported to its head office how Xintaihou piaohao’s Changsha branch was in 
difficulties when they only had 20,000 silver taels at hand, while they had to cash 
more silver bills than such an amount. Without extra silver sources, the Xintaihou 
piaohao’s Changsha branch had to ask their branch at Xiangtan to transfer silver 
sycees to Changsha, which was costly and time consuming.231 Such a letter indicated 
that although the Rishengchang piaohao noticed their counterpart Xintaihou piaohao 
in Changsha branch had problems in their daily business, they viewed such trouble 
indifferently and reported it to its head office as intelligence news without offering 
any actual help to Xintaihou piaohao.   
                                                        
228 SPS, 869. 
229 SPS, 991; for more cases on Rishengchang piaohao charged other piaohao at a standard price rate for 
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In fact, the various piaohao’s local branches were highly competitive and 
suspicious of one another. As such, they were unwilling to operate collectively. For 
example, Rishengchang engaged in intensive competitions with Weitaihou piaohao as 
early as in 1841, when the voluntary donations from various provinces bloomed. 
According to the letter written by Weitaihou’s Suzhou branch, it indicated that they 
could not conduct any remittances for the donations since Rishengchang lowered the 
commissions beyond the profit level. As a result, if Weitaihou also adopted such 
service charge rate, they could sustain losses rather than gaining profits from it.232 
Another letter by Weitaihou in 1851 also revealed that they failed to deal with a single 
penny of the Expenditures of Grain Shipment via Sea (haiyun jingfei) due to the 
competitions from Rishengchang. It further complained that it had difficulties seeking 
businesses opportunity due to the intensified competitions within the piaohao 
community.233 It also conceitedly revealed in 1851 that since a provincial official was 
dissatisfied with the remittance services provided by their counterpart Xintaihou 
piaohao, the official resorted to them to remit his private funds from then on.234 In 
fact, although Weitaihou and Xintaihou were owned by the same proprietor Hou 
Chongji, they were rivals in every remittance transactions. 
Letters from Xietongqing and Rishengchang piaohao also demonstrated the 
competitions for various remittance businesses among the local branches of piaohao. 
For example, Xietongqing piaohao’s Xi’an branch recorded in 1874 that remitting the 
grain funds from there to Lanzhou for Gansu government were monopolized by 
Tianchengheng. Thus, they had to carefully arrange to take back part of the 
business.235 Rishengchang’s Pingyao head office also indicated around the mid-1890s, 
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the Capital Requisition remittance from Guangzhou was gradually dominated by the 
branches of Zhichengxin and Xiechengqian. Therefore, they would try harder to seek 
more official remittance opportunities. 236  Around 1900, Rishengchang piaohao 
temporarily withdrew from the remittance of Capital Requisition due to the chaotic 
situation caused by the Boxer Rebellion in the Northern provinces. It then persuaded 
other piaohao to cancel the services for official remittances as well. However, no 
single piaohao adopted the proposal by Rishengchang and instead continued to 
provide remittance services to the various provincial bureaucracies.237 
Since piaohao lacked local mutual cooperation and support, each piaohao would 
rather prefer to concentrate on the official remittance business in a certain area and try 
to dominate it. Specifically, the business influence of Dadeyu piaohao was mainly in 
the Hebei province. Dedetong piaohao was based in the Shaanxi province. 
Baichuantong piaohao mainly focused their business on Sichuan, Yunnan and 
Guizhou provinces, the southwestern part of China. Weifenghou, Xietongqing and 
Tianchengheng piaohao mainly conducted their business in Shaanxi and Xinjiang 
provinces, the northwestern boarder areas of China.238  
In conclusion, piaohao did not support each other either inside or outside their 
residential counties despite the fact that both their capital and business scale were 
already limited. Consequently, all Shanxi piaohao never formed a cohesive financial 
community. They were uncompetitive in the Chinese financial market since their 
internal financial supports were actually the only available resources for them to draw 
upon, especially after 1895, when they could no longer access to the provincial 
repositories.  
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4. The defective bookkeeping methods of piaohao 
Besides the insufficiency of piaohao’s operative capital, which led to their final 
decline, their bookkeeping method was also innately defective. This was harmful to 
their survival as well. Piaohao adopted the bookkeeping method called sizhufa 
(four-column accounting) that was based on the basis of state accounting in late 
imperial China. It had four categories for recording official receipts and disbursements: 
balance forwarded (jiuguan), new receipts (xinshou), outlays (kaichu), and present 
balance (shizai). This was a single-entry system based upon a simple principle - the 
balance forwarded plus the new receipts must equal outlays plus present balance.239 
By adopting the sizhufa as their basic accounting and bookkeeping method, the 
process of profit division of the piaohao was rather easy. For example, the four 
piaohao owned by Hou family, namely Weifenghou, Weitaihou, Xintaihou and 
Weishengchang calculated their year-round profit simply by deducting what they 
owed others (gaiwai) from what others owed them (waigai), without considering 
whether what others owed them were bad debts or not.240 However, the fatal defect of 
sizhufa was that it lacked the mechanics to keep track of the capital, because no 
records of assets and liabilities were reflected on it. In the absence of capital accounts, 
rules of the thumb dictated methods for fair division of profits without depleting the 
business capital. Therefore, the account balance clearly did not represent the true 
profit.241 
Moreover, by studying another annual ledger left by Qianjisheng piaohao’s Jinan 
branch, Huang Jianhui found another innate defect lied in piaohao’s account keeping 
method. He pointed out that the ledgers about the specific loan and deposit 
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transactions made by the branches of piaohao, were never reported to the head office 
in Shanxi, since the annual ledgers made by the head office only concerned about the 
final profits gained by the various branches, without regarding to how they gained it. 
As a result, the head office of piaohao was unable to keep track of the bad debts of 
their respective branches.242 This was indeed a big and latent problem which had a 
negative impact on the accuracy of piaohao’s ledgers.  
 
5. The negative effects of currency unification on piaohao 
The last aspect related to the decline of piaohao lied in the effects brought about by 
the gradual unification of Chinese currencies. After the Ming Dynasty, China 
gradually developed a bimetallic monetary system, including copper cashes used in 
petty transactions, silver taels in the wholesale trades, and the payment to 
governmental revenues.243 However, such bimetallism system was in chaos because 
both copper cash and silver bullions lacked uniformity and standardization, and hence 
varied greatly from place to place. In fact, since the 1850s, various kinds of currency 
had been in circulation without any uniform exchange rates fixed among them. 
Moreover, foreign banks and qianzhuang in every province issued their own paper 
currency. The imported foreign silver dollars such as the Spanish dollars and Mexican 
dollars were also commonly accepted and welcomed as media of exchange in the 
southern costal areas due to its standardization in form, weight, and fineness.244 
Due to the inconveniences brought about by the chaotic bimetallism monetary 
system, the demands for currency unification became more insistent after the 
transformation of the Qing government. Finally, the silver dollar was designated as 
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the standard coin of China in 1910. The silver dollar would only be minted at the 
Central Mint and its branches in Wuhan, Guangdong, Yunnan and Sichuan.245 
Furthermore, the Qing government also wanted to centralize and standardize the 
issuance of paper currency. On 8 June 1909, the Ministry of Finance promulgated the 
Regulations on the Circulation of Silver and Cash Paper Notes (Tongyong Yinqianpiao 
Zhangcheng). It stated that only the Great Qing Bank could issue paper notes, which 
were backed up by a reserve fund. Other financial figures were not allowed to issue 
paper notes and those already in circulation must be gradually be retrieved from the 
market.246 
This regulation to unify the currencies in China brought about two negative 
effects to the survival of piaohao. First, since part of piaohao’s profits relied on the 
exchanges between different types of silver taels with different weights and finesses, 
the gradual unification of silver and the introduction of officially minted silver dollars, 
terminated the profit gained by piaohao through the different silver exchange rates. 
Consequently, 1,000 Shanghai Standard Silver taels (shanghai shengongfa guiyin) 
only equalled to 945.68 Beijing Public Standard Silver taels (jingshi jinggongfa 
zuwenyin). This means that the Shanghai Standard Silver taels were less pure than the 
Beijing ones.247 For instance, if the piaohao received 500 taels of the Beijing Public 
Standard Silvers from their customer to be remitted to Shanghai, they would then only 
pay the Shanghai drawer the 500 taels of the Shanghai Standard Silver. Piaohao thus 
gained a considerable profit from it because the Beijing silvers were more valuable 
than the Shanghai ones with the same weight. Since such exchange rates were too 
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complicated and difficult for ordinary people to handle, they usually were unable to 
perceive the nuances between the exchange rates. This allowed the Piaohao to take 
advantage of this disordered silver tael systems and to make profits prior to the 
currency unification in China. Hence, twenty percent of Rishengchang Suzhou 
branch’s profit in 1856 came from exchanging among various silver standards.248 Its 
Tianjin branch gained 1,338 silver taels through exchanges among different silver 
taels.249  
The second negative effect to the survival of piaohao was caused by the 
prevalence of convertible paper currency and minted silver dollars. Their volumes 
were much smaller than silver bullions, and thus were more convenient and safer for 
people to carry them as the medium of payments. As a result, most people would no 
longer need to remit their money before their travels or trades. Instead, they could just 
bring the convertible paper notes or the minted dollars along with them. Such trend 
was revealed in a letter from Weifenghou piaohao’s Yingkou branch in 1909. The 
letter revealed that the paper currencies gained a widespread circulation, and people 
seldom proceeded to piaohao to remit silver sycees. They would rather carry paper 
notes with them. Consequently, it appears uncertain if there would still be a need for 
remittance services.250  
 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, as compared with modern Chinese banks, the available floating 
funds that piaohao could draw upon during remittance transactions were rather 
limited. This was in fact the fundamental reason for piaohao’s failure in the 
remittance competitions with modern banks. Specifically, piaohao’s founding capital 
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was rather limited and they did not place great important to attract public deposits. 
Furthermore, due to in-cohesive financial networks, piaohao could neither gain 
financial supports from their counterparts inside their residential village nor at places 
where their branches were established. The problem of insufficient funds faced by 
piaohao became more serious especially after 1895 when they could no longer utilize 
the funds from the official repositories. Such operations were gradually taken over by 
the various central and provincial governments. Without abundant floating capitals, 
piaohao’s remittance business could not run smoothly, and this finally caused the 
decline of the business of piaohao. In addition, piaohao’s defective bookkeeping 
methods and their reliance on the gradually out-dated bimetallism monetary systems 
were also the fundamental reasons for their final decline.  
Actually, if piaohao could have avoided some of the problematic business 
behaviors, they would not have disappeared from the Chinese remittance market so 
immediately even after they no longer conducted the official remittances for the Qing 
government. Therefore, it was their innate business operations that hindered their 
survival and drove them out of the Chinese financial market. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
The social order of the Qing dynasty in its last century was in chaos due to the 
persistent internal rebellions and external invasions. This rendered the previous 
method of transferring real silver taels overland dangerous. Next from the 1820s, 
several foresighted Shanxi merchants began to provide remittance services to the 
Chinese merchants who conducted wholesale overland trades. As a result, piaohao’s 
remittance business expanded greatly during and after the Taiping Rebellion (1851-64) 
because the various Qing provincial bureaucracies asked piaohao to remit their 
financial quotas, which was safer and cheaper than the previous method of 
transferring silver taels through armed troops. From then on, piaohao became a salient 
figure in the Chinese remittance market. However, most of them disappeared after the 
demise of Qing in 1911. Thus, the most prevailing explanation for the decline was 
piaohao’s over-reliance on serving Qing government.  
Yet, the collapse of the Qing dynasty was only a catalyst of the piaohao’s final 
decline. The fundamental reasons, in fact, lie in their defective business style. 
Specifically, piaohao could not accumulate abundant floating capitals for remittance 
businesses due to their family-style capital raising mode. Moreover, they did not 
attach great important to public deposits and the effects of such neglect became more 
fatal after the Qing government took back piaohao’s rights to access to official 
treasuries and repositories from 1895. Furthermore, piaohao could not effectively get 
the financial support from their counterparts, for thirty Shanxi piaohao were only 
loosely connected with each other and had never formed coherent financial 
communities either inside their residential counties or in places where they set up 
branches. Lastly, their bookkeeping method and their dependency on outdated chaotic 
bimetallism currency system also hindered their further business survival and 
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expansion in a gradually unified and modernized Chinese financial market.  
Due to those innately defective business characters, piaohao did not carved out 
their unique niches in the Chinese remittance market as early as they began to conduct 
official remittances in 1860s. None of a single piaohao had ever monopolized the 
provincial remittance businesses because their limited floating capital did not allow 
them to do so. In fact, a piaohao not only had to compete with other piaohao for a 
single bill of official remittance, it also faced competition for handling official 
remittances from other financial figures that operated concurrently with piaohao 
during that time, such as remittance firms.  
To a larger extent, piaohao did not own niches in the Chinese financial market as 
well, for on the one hand, they could not meet the basic financial needs of the popular 
which was what the qianzhuang could do. On the other hand, they could not finance 
modern industries and extend credits to Qing government, unlike the modern Chinese 
banks which could. Thus the piaohao’s influence in the Chinese financial market in 
the late imperial time was rather limited and the decline of Shanxi piaohao was a 
long-term evolution which had started since 1860s, and was latent long before the 
demise of Qing.  
In addition, contrary to the commonly accepted idea, the previous chapters have 
illustrated that Shanxi piaohao did not gain benefits from serving the Qing 
government without any sufferance. They had to negotiate constantly with the 
government to avoid the latter’s frequent financial appeals to them since 1850s. 
Piaohao eventually formed a frightened sentiment towards the Qing government. As a 
result, they refrained from collaborating with the Qing government although they 
were invited to do so when Qing began to establish modern Chinese banks and 
promulgated unprecedented regulations on supervising the financial market since 
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1895. Piaohao thus lost the chances to reform to catch up with the modernization 
process of the Qing government in the realm of banking and finance, which further 
accelerated their decline.  
In sum, the reasons for the decline of Shanxi piaohao are a combination of 
factors. Some reasons are that modern Chinese and foreign banks were more efficient 
and better funded; some modern Chinese banks gained the government’s preferential 
treatment after 1895. Another reason is because piaohao did not have a good vision of 
their business development. The most fundamental reasons are related to the 
piaohao’s defective capital raising and absorbing modes. Thus, their decline was 
already latent as soon as they started to operate in the Chinese financial market since 
1820s. The decline of Qing dynasty was only a direct cause than a decisive factor. 
Lastly, reconstructing the history of Shanxi piaohao and analyzing their decline 
would distinguish its particular financial status that is semi-independent and 
semi-dependent on the Qing government from other contemporary financial 
institutions such as qianzhuang and modern Chinese banks. Piaohao’s interactions 
with the Qing government would further shed lights on the latter’s transition to a more 
centralized financial administration during the last half of the nineteenth-century. In 
addition, studying the operation and management characters of piaohao could also 
contribute to the business history of family firms of late Qing dynasty China.  
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Appendix 

















1823 Pingyao Li Daquan李大全 Dye firm 200-300 
Weitaihou  
蔚泰厚 
1826 Pingyao Hou Chongji侯崇基 Silk firm 100-350 
Weifenghou 
蔚丰厚 
1826 Pingyao Hou Chongji侯崇基 Silk firm 200-300 
Weishengchang
蔚盛长 
1826 Pingyao Hou Chongji 侯崇基 , 
Wang Peinan 王培南 et 
al. 
Silk firm 200-240 
Xintaihou 
新泰厚 
1826 Pingyao Hou Chongji 侯崇基 , 
Zhao Yidi赵一第 et al. 
Silk firm 150-260 
Tianchengheng
天成亨 
1826 Pingyao Hou Chongji侯崇基 Ma 







1838~42 Pingyao N.A. N.A. N.A. 
                                                        
251 This table is made according to SPS, 638-62. 
252 The founding capitals of piaohao were only an approximate estimation due to the sporadic available data. And 
the most important reason is the founding capitals of piaohao were rather fluid, for the own properties and deposits 
of the proprietors and the working capitals were never distinctively separated and they could be withdrawn at any 




1853 Pingyao Wang Dong王栋 N.A. N.A. 
Xietongqing 
协同庆 





1860 Pingyao Qu Yuanzhen渠源浈, Qu 





1862~64 Pingyao Ji Yihe冀以和 N.A. 100 
Qianjisheng 
谦吉升 
1862~64 Pingyao Li Daquan李大全 et al. N.A. 100 
Weichanghou
蔚长厚 
1864 Pingyao Hou Chongji 侯崇基 et 
al. 
Cloth shop 




1862~64 Pingyao Ji Yihe冀以和 N.A. N.A. 
Baofenglong 
宝丰隆 
1906 Pingyao Zhao Erfeng 赵尔丰 , 





1837 Qi Guo Fengyuan 郭逢源 , 
Zhang Tingjiang张廷将 
Tea firm 100-500 
Dadexing 
大德兴 
1851~61 Qi Qiao Jin Tang乔锦堂253 Tea firm N.A. 
Dadetong 1884 Qi Sun Zhi孙郅 Tea firm 120-350 
                                                        
253 This is not an actual proprietor’s name. Tang 堂 literally means hall. According to David Faure, Chinese 
merchants during Ming and Qing traded in the name of his business (the hao号), but held his property under a 






1859 Qi Sun Zhi孙郅 N.A. 100 
Sanjinyua 
三晋源 
1862~65 Qi Qu Yuanzhen渠源浈 N.A. 200 
Cunyigon 
存义公 
1862~65 Qi Qu Yuanzhen 渠源浈 et 
al. 




1884 Qi Qu Yuanchao 渠源潮 et 
al. 
Tea firm 160-200 
Dadeheng 
大德恒 
1881 Qi Qiao Jin Tang乔锦堂 N.A. 260 
Dashengchuan
大盛川 
1889~1890 Qi Dashengkui 大盛魁 254 , 
Zhang Tingjiang 张廷将 
et al. 
Cash shop 100 
Dadeyuan 
大德源 
1888 Qi Qiao Lansan乔兰三 Tea firm 100 
Zhichengxin 
志成信 
1850 Taigu Cao Fushan Tang曹福善
堂 et al. 










1893 Taigu Yang Shengtai杨生泰  Cash shop 300 
Jinshengrun  
锦生润 
1903 Taigu Cao Shixian 曹师宪 , 
Chang Ansheng常安生 
N.A. 90 
                                                        





1907 Taigu Chang Wanda常万达 N.A. 200 
Sanheyuan  
三和源 
1875 Taigu Surnamed Chang 常氏 N.A. N.A. 
Dadeyu  
大德玉 
1885 Taigu Chang Lixun常立训 Tea firm 220 
 






Fukang 阜康(a.k.a. Hutongyu 
胡通裕 in Hangzhou and Shanghai) 
1863~65 Shanghai  Hu Guangyong 胡光墉 
(From Zhejiang province)  
Tianshunxiang  
天顺祥(a.k.a Tongqingfeng同庆丰 in 
Yunan) 
1865 Yunan Wang Xingzhai 王兴斋，Wan 
Yinian万伊年  
(all from Yunnan)  
Yuanfengrun  
源丰润 
1883~89 Shanghai Yanxinhou 严信厚 
(From Jiangsu province) 
                                                        
255 Table 2 is made according to SPS, 662-4. 
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Glossary 
baguo lianjun 八国联军 
Baichuantong 百川通 
Beijing 北京  
Bianliang (Henan) 汴梁 
Cao 曹  
Cen Yuying 岑毓英 
Changde (Hunan) 常德 
Changsha (Hunan) 长沙 
Changshengchuan 长盛川 
Chengdu (Sichuan) 成都  






daqing yinhang zeli大清银行则例 














Guangdong fanku广东藩库  





Guilin (Guangxi) 桂林 
haifang jingfei 海防经费 
Haijun yamen 海军衙门 
Hangzhou (Zhejiang) 杭州  








Hou Chongji 侯崇基 
Hou Zhongzhu侯中铸 
Hou 侯  
Hu Guangyong 胡光墉  (a.k.a. Hu 
Xueyan胡雪岩) 
Huben 护本 
Hubu yinhang 户部银行 
Hui 回 












Jinan (Shandong) 济南 
jingshi jing gongfa zuwenyin京师京公
砝足纹银 
jingshi shangwu zonghui 京师商务总
会 
jinsheng huiye yinhang 晋省汇业银行 










Lei Luetai 雷履泰 
Li Daquan李大全 
Li Hongling李宏龄 
Li Hongzhang 李鸿章 
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lian tian bi 连天璧 
liangdao粮道 
libu waiyi 利不外溢 
lijin 厘金 
Liu Kunyi 刘坤一 
Lu Shaoguo 陆绍国 
Mao Honghui毛鸿翙  
Mao Yunsheng 毛 云 生 (a.k.a Mao 
Honghan, 毛鸿翰) 
Mao 毛 






pingbang  平帮 
pingqitai sanbang 平祁太三帮 
pingyao 平遥 
pushui 铺税 
putong yinhang 普通银行 















Sanyuan (Shaanxi) 三原 
Shaanxi 陕西  









Shashi (Hubei) 沙市 
Shenbao 申报 
Sheng Jifu 升吉甫 






shouyusuo qianzong 守御所千总 
Sizhufa 四柱法 
Sun孙 
Suzhou (Jiangsu) 苏州  
Taigu (Shanxi) 太谷 
taigubang  太谷帮 
Tianchengheng天成亨 
tianchengju 天成局 
Tianjin 天津  
Tianshuixian天顺祥 
tongyong yinqianpiao zhangcheng 通用
银钱票章程 
Tongzhou zhonggao 同舟忠告 
tushuiju 土税局 
waigai 外该 





Wuzhou (Guangxi) 梧州  
Xi’an (Shaanxi) 西安 








xishang  西商 
Xiyucheng 西裕成 
Xu Rufen 许汝棻 
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yaliju 牙厘局  
Yan Xinhou 严信厚 
Yangzhou (Jiangsu) 扬州 
yinghang tongxing zeli银行通行则例 




Yu Liansan 俞廉三 
Yuanfengjiu 元丰玖 
Yuanfengrun 源丰润 




Zeng Guoquan 曾国荃 
Zhang Jinghao 张景灏 
Zhang Linge 张麟阁 
Zhang Siheng 章嗣衡  
zhanggui 掌柜 
Zhangjiakou (Zhili) 张家口 
Zhao Erxun赵尔巽  







Zhili yinhang 直隶银行 
Zhili 直隶 




Zhoujiakou (Henan) 周家口 
Zuo Zongtang左宗棠
 
 
 
